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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Since 1997, the Investor-Compensation Schemes Directive 97/9/EC ('ICSD')1 ensures that 
at least one Investor Compensation Scheme ('ICS') exists in all Member States which 
protect clients of investment firms and banks engaging in investment services up to at least 
EUR 20,000 against the risk that their service provider is not able to return clients' 
securities or repay money in accordance with the legal and contractual conditions 
applicable; e.g. due to fraud, negligence or mismanagement. However, the ICSD does not 
make such an event or the proof of it a requirement for compensation for the investor. The 
Directive does not prevent ICS and their members to take out insurance to cover in full or 
partially their obligations. 
In 2010, the Commission has proposed amendments to the directive (see COM 
(2010)371)2 which would lead inter alia to a higher coverage of EUR 50,000 and inclusion 
of depositories of investment firms or investment funds/units in Undertakings for Collective 
Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS). The European Parliament (EP) adopted a 
report on the proposal on 5 July 20113 and demanded changes to the proposal, namely: 
                                         
(i) a raised coverage level of EUR 100,000 (see amendment 24),  
(ii) compensation (only) in cases of fraud, administrative malpractice, and operational 
error as well as bad advice regarding conduct of business obligations when providing 
investment services to clients (see amendment 204;'the four events'); 
(iii) deletion of proposed compensation (to UCITS investors) for failure of depositary or 
sub-custodian of a UCITS (see amendment 21, 22), and  
(iv) transparency of ICS contributions and/or insurance premiums to (potential) clients 
(see amendment 62). 
One core question within the discussion is the funding of ICS. The EP was particularly 
interested in alternative coverage and 'funding' possibilities, in particular insurance 
solutions. 
Consequently, this study deals with the question whether private insurance undertakings 
could fully or partially take over the risks from existing ICS. With full replacement, all 
damage caused to investors by these four events (fraud, administrative malpractice, 
operational error and bad advice) would be taken over. With partial replacement, the 
insurance undertaking would only pay for damages up to a specific level (cap) or only 
related to a subset of these four risk events.  
 
1 Directive 97/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 March 1997 on investor compensation 
schemes, OJ L 84 of 26.3.97, p. 22;   
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1997:084:0022:0031:EN:PDF. 
2 European Commission (2010a), Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 97/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on investor compensation schemes, 
Brussels, 12.7.2010, COM(2010) 371 final,  
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0371:FIN:EN:PDF. 
3 European Parliament (2011): European Parliament legislative resolution of 5 July 2011 on the proposal for a 
directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 97/9/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on investor-compensation schemes, P7_TA(2011)0313.   
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2011-0313&language=EN. 
4 Consequently, this amendment might lead to a possible limitation of scope, i.e. restricted to the mentioned 
cases - while the previous wording just set the requirement that the investment firm is not able to duly return 
assets or monies. 
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The main findings of the study are as follows: 
 The introduction of the four events by the EP into the directive adds an additional layer 
of complexity to the question whether ICS (or insurance undertakings) should 
compensate (or offer coverage) in a specific case. More clarity is necessary on the exact 
meaning of those events and on the allocation of the burden of proof. Without such 
clarity, private insurance supply is unlikely. 
 Partial replacement of the ICS does not seem to be a viable option because it might 
impair the incentives of insurance undertakings, ICSs and investment firms. Moreover, 
problems in the damage compensation process are likely to be expected. This holds true 
in part also, if an ICS buys such partial insurance (e.g. AeW in Austria). 
 Full (and mandatory) replacement of the ICS may improve risk assessment and risk 
controlling and the incentives of investment firms, but is likely to increase the costs of 
investor compensation, especially because insurance undertakings need data for 
actuarial risk assessments.  
In order to gather information for this study, detailed questionnaires have been sent out to 
various addressees (see Annex 2). Responses indicate a general unwillingness by insurance 
undertakings to enter this market. They are particularly unlikely to offer full insurance with 
unlimited coverage per investment firm. Allowing for liability caps makes a supply of such 
insurances more likely, but only slightly so. The main reasons mentioned are insufficient 
available data for proper risk assessment, the lack of re-insurance and the small size of the 
national markets. Scarce data suggests that the price of a full insurance contract with a 
liability cap of EUR 5 million will be significantly more costly than the current ICS 
contributions. However, current ICS levies might be too low considering the true risk of 
investment firms. 
Hence, since full insurance might only by realisable with a liability cap per investment firm, 
the (continued) existence of an ICS might still be necessary to cover for the failure of large 
investment firms - provided the ICS is able to do so. There might be a way out of the latter 
issue if the ICS - and not the single investment firms - buys insurance coverage for all 
‘basic model’ damages incurred by the investment firms being members of the ICS. From 
an economic perspective, this approach could make sense if there is an ‘excess of loss’ 
insurance which only covers damages exceeding a specific liability floor (e.g. EUR 15 million 
in Ireland) up to another specific liability cap (e.g. EUR 50 million in Ireland). In this set-
up, there is an insurance effect while the incentives of ICS and insurer are not distorted too 
much.  
Risk diversification will be improved if several insurers together provide insurance for the 
ICS (as actually is the case in Ireland) or for large investment firms. Such insurance pools 
tend to reduce competition between insurers, though. Indeed, in Ireland, the local ICS 
(ICCL) concluded an insurance contract with Lloyd’s of London. Lloyd’s is not an insurance 
undertaking but an insurance market where the members of Lloyd’s jointly insure risks. 
The responses to the questionnaires indicate that insurances taken out by the ICS only 
exist in Ireland and Austria. In other EU countries, it never existed or does not exist 
anymore (Greece, Lithuania). This is so even though several EU Member States leave their 
ICS the option to purchase insurance. Problems mentioned are the lack of information for 
actuarial risk assessment and/or the high costs of insurance. So far, there is insufficient 
data to conclude whether taking out ‘excess of loss’ insurance pays off for the ICS. 
From a theoretical point of view, systemic risk is considerably lower with investment firms 
and insurance undertakings than with (commercial) banks. Still, systemic risk might be an 
issue with highly leveraged and interconnected insurance undertakings engaging a lot in 
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non-core activities (such as derivatives trading). The existence and use of insurance pools 
and re-insurance will influence the size of systemic risk. Supervisory bodies do not expect 
that systemic risk increases significantly with full or partial replacement of ICS by private 
insurance as long as there is limited coverage or adequate re-insurance. This assessment 
also holds when the ICS takes out insurance. But systemic risk may increase in case of a 
large damage of an insured investment firm. 
Investment firms should not be required to disclose ICS charges or insurance contract 
terms because the benefits of transparency are very limited. Charges will not only depend 
on the investment firm’s riskiness, but also on its size and the features of the insurance 
contracts. Thus, charges are comparable only to a very limited extent.  
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1. INTRODUCTION AND STATUS QUO 
ICS are in place for some time now and are part of the overall framework of regulation of 
the financial sector in the EU. Thus, their rules have to be assessed in context with other 
relevant provisions, such as for instance the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive (DGSD), 
the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) or the Undertakings for Collective 
Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) Directive taking into account the current 
discussions and changes in these parts of the framework. 
1.1. Definitions 
The study uses the following definitions: 
 Basic Model: The Basic Model on which this study is based and which is explained 
in Section 2.1. mirrors the EP's voted amendments regarding the proposal to amend 
the present ICSD regarding scope (only non-UCITS clients of investment firms), 
coverage (EUR 100,000) and preconditions for investor compensation;5 
 Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS): According to the DGSD, deposit guarantee 
schemes reimburse bank account holders up to EUR 100,000 of deposits in case the 
bank is not able to repay due claims;6 
 Insurance undertaking: An authorised direct life or non-life insurance undertaking 
according to the Solvency II Directive;7 
 Investment firm: According to the ICSD (read in conjunction with the MiFID), an 
investment firm is any entity authorised by a competent authority to provide 
investment services to third parties or which performs investment activities, e.g. 
execution of orders on behalf of clients and portfolio management.8 Banks/credit 
institutions may also provide investment services and are in this case regarded as 
investment firms for the purposes of the ICSD; 
 Investor: According to the ICSD,9 an investor is any person who entrusts money or 
instruments, e.g. transferable securities, to an investment firm in connection with 
investment business; 
 Investor compensation scheme: According to the ICSD, 10  an investor 
compensation scheme is an entity that provides coverage for investors when an 
investment firm is unable to repay money or to return assets belonging to them; 
 Undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS): 
According to the UCITS Directive,11 a UCITS is an authorised undertaking the sole 
object of which is the collective investment of capital raised from the public in 
transferable securities and/or in other liquid financial assets and the units of which 
are, at the request of holders, re-purchased or redeemed at any time. Such UCITS 
are harmonised investment funds which can be marketed within the EU via a 
passporting procedure. This is not the case for non-harmonised nationally licensed 
investment funds. 
                                          
5 European Parliament (2011), Resolution P7_TA(2011)0313;   
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2011-0313&language=EN. 
6 Directive 94/19/EC (Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive 'DGSD'), as amended by Directive 2009/14/EC 
which prescribes a cover of at least EUR 100,000. 
7 Article 13 (1) Directive 2009/138/EC (Solvency II). 
8 Article 1 (1) of Directive 97/9/EC (ICSD); Article 4 (1), (2), and Annex 1 Section A of Directive 2004/39/EC 
(MiFID). 
9 Article 1 (4) of Directive 97/9/EC (ICSD). 
10 Article 2 (2) Directive 97/9/EC (ICSD). 
11 Article 1 (2) Directive 2009/65/EC (UCITS). 
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1.2. Existing investor compensation schemes (ICS) in the EU 
In the European Union, ICS cover for an investment firm’s inability to repay money or to 
return assets to investors (Investor Compensation Scheme Directive 97/9/EC; 'ICSD'). All 
27 European Member States must have at least one ICS. Most ICS are financed by regular 
financial contributions of investment firms. 
The following figure shows the common current functioning of ICS.  

















Investor 1 Investor 4 Investor 3 Investor 2 
Investor Compensation Scheme 












Contributions of investment firms to the investor compensation scheme 
Compensation by investor compensation scheme to investors 
 
Source:  CEP/Bigus. 
1.3. Status of legislative proceedings 
The current ICSD dates back to March 1997. Its initial aim was to establish an ICS in each 
Member State to protect at least small investors in case an investment firm was unable to 
meet its obligations.12 The EP and the Council considered the protection of investors and 
the maintenance of confidence in the financial system being ‘an important aspect of the 
completion and proper functioning of the internal market’.13 
In the ten years that followed, the Commission received numerous complaints ‘principally 
related to the coverage and funding of schemes and delays in obtaining compensation’.14 
Hence, and in order to restore investors’ confidence given the financial crisis, the 
Commission decided to review the ICSD. The proposal COM(2010) 371 for a Directive 
amending Directive 97/9/EC was adopted on 12 July 2010.15 
The review of the ICSD as well as the review of the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive 
94/19/EC (DGSD) as well as the White Paper on Insurance Guarantee Schemes16 all aim at 
strengthening trust in financial stability. This shall be achieved by improved protection for 
                                          
12 Directive 97/9/EC (ICSD), Recital 4. 
13 Directive 97/9/EC (ICSD), Recital 4. 
14 European Commission (2010a), p.2. 
15 European Commission (2010a). 
16 European Commission (2010c), White Paper on Insurance Guarantee Schemes, COM(2010) 370, Brussels, 
12 July 2010. 
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retail clients of financial service providers and is a precondition for the smooth functioning 
of the financial system. 
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) of the EP published its Report on 
the proposal on 19 April 2011 (Rapporteur: Olle Schmidt, ALDE, Sweden). 17  The EP 
adopted its legislative resolution on 5 July 2011.18 Amongst other things, it was in favour of 
an EU-wide uniform protection level of EUR 100,000. 
However, the Council has not yet reached a general approach. In particular, there are 
different views between Member States on the coverage level. Some Member States see no 
need to increase the current level of EUR 20,000 minimum coverage per claimant while 
others favour a harmonised maximum level of EUR 50,000. Most Member States reject to 
extend the scope of the Directive to UCITS as customers of investment firms.19 
                                          
17 A7-0167/2011. 
18 European Parliament (2011), Resolution P7_TA(2011)0313. 
19 Council of the European Union; Progress report of the Presidency, Council document No. 12032/11, Brussels 
24 June 2011. 
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2. SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
KEY FINDINGS 
 The scope of this study is a ‘Basic Model’ which mirrors the European Parliament’s 
resolution on amending the Investor Compensation Schemes Directive (ICSD). 
 Due to its wording and by the lack of rules on the allocation of the burden of proof, 
the European Parliament’s resolution might reduce the scope of coverage by ICS to 
investors as compared to the current ICSD.  
This study analyses 
 whether the coverage offered to clients of investment firms by ICS can be replaced 
by coverage provided by private insurance contracts and 
 the impact which such a replacement would have. 
2.1. The Basic Model: consequences and issues 
The scope of the study is limited to a so-called ‘Basic Model’, defined as follows: 
 ICS covers individual damage up to EUR 100,000 for each investor per investment 
firm. 
 ICS provides coverage if an investment firm is not able to repay money or to return 
assets and this being a consequence of one of the following events:  
 fraud, 
 administrative malpractice, 
 operational error, or 
 bad advice regarding conduct of business obligations when providing 
investment services to clients. 
 ICS shall compensate investors as soon as possible and at the latest within three 
months of the establishment of the eligibility and the amount of the claim. 
This Basic Model mirrors the European Parliament’s resolution in its first reading of 5 July 
2011 on amending the Investor Compensation Scheme Directive 97/9/EC.20 The following 
table shows how the Basic Model relates to the Commission’s proposal and to the current 
situation (Directive 97/9/EC). 
                                          
20 European Parliament (2011), Resolution P7_TA(2011)0313. 
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2.1.1. Consequences of the EP Basic Model and possible disadvantages for 
investors 
While the EP resolution extends the level of compensation for investors to EUR 100,000; at 
the same time, it restricts the variety of cases in which ICS must offer coverage to 
investors. The ICSD as well as the Commission’s proposal do not link coverage to any other 
preconditions than to the mere (confirmed) inability of an investment firm to repay money 
or return assets. The question what exactly is the cause of this inability, is irrelevant. 
According to the EP resolution, ICS must offer coverage only where this inability is ‘the 
result of fraud, administrative malpractice, operational error or bad advice’.21 The wording 
of the EP resolution suggests this to be an exhaustive enumeration. In that case, the 
occurrence of one of these four events is a necessary – but not sufficient – condition for 
receiving coverage by the investor compensation scheme. 
Arguably, the introduction of these four events in the text of the Article could result in 
investors not being compensated for cases (such as force majeure), which today are 
covered by ICS.  
2.1.2. Burden of proof in regard to fraud, administrative malpractice, 
operational error or bad advice 
Under the current ICSD, an investor compensation scheme must compensate investors, if 
 ‘competent authorities have determined (...) an instrument firm (...) to be unable 
to meet (...) investors’ claims or  
 a judicial authority has made a ruling (...) which has the effect of suspending 
investors’ ability to make claims against’ the investment firm.’22 
Consequently, the provisions of the ICSD do not need to contain any further provisions on 
the allocation of the burden of proof.  
The EP’s resolution – and hence also the Basic Model – introduces on the one hand a new 
element of complexity, as investor compensation schemes must compensate investors only 
upon (additional) fulfilment of one (or more) of the four events (fraud, administrative 
malpractice, operational error or bad advice). On the other hand, the EP’s resolution 
                                          
21 European Parliament (2011), Resolution P7_TA(2011)0313, Amendment 20. 
22 Article 2 (2) ICSD. 
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remains silent on the allocation of the burden of proof regarding these preconditions for 
coverage. It has yet to be specified who will have to prove that one (or more) of these 
‘events’ did - or did not - occur. This could be the client, the investment firm, the ICS, or 
the competent/judicial authority).  
Leaving it up to the investor to offer proof of fraud, administrative malpractice, operation 
error or bad advice seems rather problematic. In a large majority of cases, it might prove 
impossible for investors to gather sufficient and convincing information enabling them to do 
so. Thus, this text might well have been inserted in the Directive's text with the best 
intentions, but might - if adopted for the final text of the Directive - turn out to work 
against investors' interests. 
Box 1: The difficulties of covering bad advice 
The difficulties of covering bad advice 
The EP’s resolution introduces bad advice as one of the four events which may trigger 
compensation by ICS. Typically, cases of bad advice differ from cases of fraud, 
administrative malpractice or operational error in the following way:  
Following bad advice, assets will generally remain available in the securities account, 
though their value might have decreased to a considerable degree. This might be the 
consequence of those assets belonging to a high risk asset category - which the 
investor claims to have been unaware of and unwilling to invest in. 
However, according to the wording of the EP’s resolution, ICS do not compensate such 
bad advice per se. (The same holds true for fraud, administrative malpractice and 
operational error). Compensation is provided for only where investments firms are 
unable to repay money or to return assets as a consequence of bad advice. 
Hence, typical cases of bad advice may not be covered by the approach contained 
presently in the EP’s resolution.  
2.1.3. Exclusion of UCITS 
UCITS are harmonised investment funds23 which enable e.g. small investors to invest in a 
diversified way by buying the units of a UCITS. The UCITS invests the money by buying 
certain securities and other eligible instruments. UCITS are obliged to keep these 
instruments with a designated 'depositary' 24  which might employ sub-custodians. 
Depositaries and sub-custodians are not necessarily investment firms according to the 
MiFID Directive (see explanation in the next paragraph) and thus not covered by the ICSD. 
Thus, the ICSD does cover units of (harmonised and non-harmonised) collective investment 
undertakings which are part of an investor's account with a failing investment firm covered 
by the ICSD. But it does not cover losses (in the value) of UCITS units suffered by 
investors in UCITS as a consequence of a failure by a UCITS' depositary or sub-custodian. 
                                          
23 UCITS stands for 'undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities' and designates harmonised 
investment funds. They are covered by Directive 2009/65/EC on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS 
Directive). 
24 See Article 22 of the UCITS Directive 2009/65/EC. 
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The reason is that according to Article 2 (2) of the ICSD, only losses ‘in connection with’ 
investment business are covered. According to Article 1 (2) of the ICSD, investment 
business means any investment service according to Annex 1 Section A of the MiFID and 
the ancillary service of safekeeping and administration of financial instrument for the 
account of clients according to Annex 1 Section B (1) of the MiFID.25 However, according to 
Article 2 (1) (h) of the MiFID, UCITS and its depositaries are exempted from the MiFID. 
The Commission’s proposal to include a UCITS’ depositary default into the scope of ICS has 
its grounds in the following specific feature: UCITS’ assets must be kept with a depositary. 
In the case of failure of such a UCITS’ depositary, assets in which a UCITS has invested 
may be lost. However, the UCITS' units or UCITS' shares of an investor will still exist – 
even though they might lose in value. Thus, rather untypical to the classical functioning of 
ICS, the Commission proposed to specifically compensate losses in value of such UCITS' 
units/shares. 
In contrast to the European Commission, both the EP and the Council question the 
extension of the scope of the Directive to include the failure of a UCITS depositary. 26  
Instead, the EP wants the extension to be discussed in the review of the UCITS Directive 
that deals with the depositaries liability regime in detail.  
2.2. Private insurance contracts within the Basic Model 
2.2.1. Private insurance contract arrangements 
This study deals with private insurance contracts within the Basic Model in the following 
arrangements: 
 mandatory full insurance, 
 mandatory partial insurance, 
 Voluntary and partial insurance. 
We start by considering private insurance contracts taken out by investment firms. 
Private insurance coverage could also be taken out by ICS for its members; this scenario 
is part of this study, too, see chapters 4.2.5, 4.3.2 and 5.2.4. 
Figure 2 in Annex I gives an overview of the main scenarios of private insurance contracts 
taken out by investment firms. These contracts might replace fully or partially the 
contributions of investment firms to the ICS.  
 Mandatory full replacement is only possible when the investment firm has taken out 
one (or more) insurance policy/policies covering all four ‘events’ of the Basic Model 
without application of any liability cap. Under full replacement, the investment firms 
no longer need to be member of the ICS (which could, consequently, cease to 
exist).27 
                                          
.2.4
25 According to Annex 1 Section A (9) of the Proposal COM(2011) 656 for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on markets in financial instruments repealing the MiFID (Recast), the safekeeping and 
administration of financial instruments is an investment service (main service) and no longer an ancillary 
service. 
26 European Parliament (2011); Resolution P7_TA(2011)0313; Council of the European Union, Progress Report by 
the Presidency. 
27 Assuming that these private insurances would not entail a liability cap. If they would, ICS might still be 
necessary, see chapter 4 . 
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 Mandatory partial replacement means that only some of the four ‘events’ are 
covered by the insurance (e.g. fraud). In the partial replacement scenario, the 
investment firm remains an ICS member, but only for those risks not covered by the 
private insurance(s).28 
Insurances can be voluntary or mandatory, the latter meaning each investment firm has 
to prove the (initial and continued) existence of an appropriate private insurance coverage 
in order to be authorised to offer its services. Depending on the willingness of insurance 
undertakings to take on compensation risk, private insurance contracts might cover all 
compensation requests or might be capped at a certain amount. In this case of a cap, ICS 
will have to continue and provide coverage to those members for the remaining risk if full 
coverage shall be maintained. 
2.2.2. Analysis of private insurance contracts 
For each of the scenarios described above, this study describes the  
 Economic issues 
 Financial issues 
 Legal issues 
 Systemic risks and  
 Transparency issues 
involved. 
The empirical input for this analysis was gathered by sending specific questionnaires to 
 Insurance associations in 27 Member States as well as on the European level, 
 Insurance undertakings in all 27 Member States, 
 All ICS in all 27 Member States, 
 EIOPA as well as all national insurance supervisory authorities, 
 Selected investment firms and investment firms’ associations, both on the level of 
all 27 Member States and on the European level. 
The questionnaires are displayed in Annex 2. 
                                          
28 Probably causing the investment firm’s contribution to the ICS to decrease. 
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3. EXISTING INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR (PARTS OF) 
INVESTOR COMPENSATION 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Existing crime insurances and pecuniary loss liability insurances show some 
similarities with the preconditions set out by the EP for ICS to compensate investors. 
 In at least nine Member States, national regulations allow for ICS taking out 
insurances or set out explicitly preconditions for ICS to do so. 
 One ICS (ICCL in Ireland) has taken out an ‘excess of loss’ insurance. An insurance 
pooling solution has been used for this. An Austrian ICS (AeW) has taken out partial 
private insurance covering ICS-damages caused by fraud at investment firms. 
 At least two ICS (Greece and Lithuania) have taken out insurance in the past, but 
meanwhile ceased doing so.  
 At the level of investment firms, in one Member State (Germany) a partial 
replacement of ICS-membership by private insurance contracts is possible.  
3.1. Relevant insurance products and insurance settings 
3.1.1. Description of relevant insurance products 
Crime insurance 
‘Crime insurance’, often also known as fidelity insurance or bankers’ blanket bond is a 
widespread type of insurance concluded by businesses covering against the risk of fraud 
and other tortuous acts committed by employees of a company (‘confidants’) or third 
parties for whom the company is liable. As the term ‘crime insurance’ implies, insurance 
coverage usually comprises intentional illicit conduct undertaken by confidants for which 
the company is liable to pay compensation. In case jobholders or third parties perpetrate 
tortuous acts, the insurance pays the incurred damage to the company. Such loss can be a 
loss in inventory, money or securities. Typically, claims are caused by employees’ or third 
parties’ dishonesty, robbery, embezzlement, forgery, theft or computer-related crime. In 
case the company seeks for compensation for damages caused to the company or its 
clients (to be paid by the insurance undertaking), it normally has to prove towards the 
insurance undertaking the cause and volume of the confidant’s obligation to pay 
compensation towards its employer. 
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Box 2: Risk calculation by insurance undertakings for crime insurance 
How do insurance undertakings calculate the risk of crime insurance? 
Although it is up to each insurance undertaking itself to develop its own risk assessment 
tools, there are at least four variables which seem to be common in assessing the risk 
profile of a potential crime insurance taker. 
First, the number of confidants (i.e. those employees whose illicit behaviour may cause 
insurance coverage) plays a key role. The larger that number, the larger the risk and 
hence the insurance premium will be. 
Second, the amount insured will directly influence risk and consequently premiums for 
crime insurance products. 
Third, rebates or surcharges on the premium are applied, depending on the ‘loss 
history’ of the insurance taker. Insurance undertakings will analyse whether or not 
cases of illicit behaviour have occurred in the past with the insurance taker. Past 
‘frequency losses’, which are rather small and occur on a regular and foreseeable basis 
will lead to a moderate additional charge in the insurance premium. In case of large, 
unexpected losses in the past, higher additional charges will be applied. 
Fourth, depending on the insurance taker’s industry, risk and hence premiums will be 
adjusted up- or downwards. 
Pecuniary loss liability insurance/Directors and Officers (D&O) insurance 
‘Pecuniary loss liability insurance’ is taken out by companies and provides coverage for the 
infringement of contractual duties undertaken by employees of the company with the 
consequence of pecuniary detriment. The insurance is a kind of professional indemnity 
insurance or ‘errors and omissions’ insurance that insures money damage caused by 
negligence. Usually, personal injury and damage to property is not covered. Pecuniary loss 
liability insurances thus protect policyholders from the consequences of, e.g. operational 
error, administrative malpractice or bad advice. Typical policy holders are medical 
personnel, freelancers, lawyers and auditors. 
A special type of pecuniary loss liability insurance is the so called D&O (Directors and 
Officers) insurance. Unlike the aforesaid, D&O insurance solely protects the management 
body and other executive staff against claims for indemnity due to infringement of 
contractual duties. In order to avoid hazardous behaviour by this particular group of 
persons, the insurance does not protect the policy holder against intentional misconduct. 
3.1.2. Description of relevant insurance settings 
‘Excess of loss’ Insurance 
‘Excess of loss’ insurances cover losses that exceed a certain threshold (‘liability floor’) up 
to another specified threshold (‘liability cap’). Thus, in case the incurred damage is below 
the liability floor, the insured entity is fully responsible to pay compensation to a claimant. 
In case the incurred damage is between the liability floor and the cap, the policy holder has 
to indemnify up to the amount of the floor, whereas the insurance undertaking pays 
compensation for all losses in excess of the floor amount. In case the losses exceed the 
PE 492.451 20 
Alternatives to Investor Compensation Schemes and their Impact 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
liability cap, the insurer pays for all damage between the floor and the cap. Whether floors 
and caps apply per annum, per case or per contract duration is a matter of negotiation. 
Table 2: ‘Excess of loss’ insurance 
Example Incurred loss:  
EUR 100 million 
Incurred loss:  
EUR 550 million 
Incurred loss:  
EUR 900 million 
Liability floor:  
EUR 150 million 
Liability cap:  
EUR 800 million 
Insured entity pays 
EUR 100 million 
Insured entity pays EUR 
150 million. 
Insurer pays EUR 400 
million. 
Insured entity pays EUR 150 
million + EUR 100 million = 
EUR 250 million. 
Insurer pays EUR 650 
(= 800−150) million. 
Source:  CEP/Bigus. 
As will be shown below, ‘excess of loss’ insurances can be (and have been) taken out by 
ICS to cover compensation claims exceeding a specific amount (the liability floor). The Irish 
ICS is currently insured by an ‘excess of loss’ insurance. For details see Section 3.3. 
Insurance Pools 
Insurance pools are mainly applied in the civil aviation or in nuclear energy industry. They 
allow insurance of high-cost events which may occur with a relatively small number of 
insurance takers (airlines, nuclear energy producers). The advantage of an insurance pool 
is that several insurance companies cooperate to mutually bear the risk of a damage event 
(joint liability). Given the small number of insurers and the high costs upon damage event, 
it is clear that one single insurance undertaking is not able to offer such insurance.  
Upon damage, the indemnity to the policy holder is paid using the means in the insurance 
pool. The distribution of payment obligations amongst participating insurance undertakings 
is usually determined in the contract that establishes the pool.  
Box 3: Lloyd’s of London 
Lloyd’s of London 
Lloyd’s of London is essentially the world’s largest and best developed (re)insurance 
pool. It is an (re)insurance market rather than an (re)insurance undertaking. At Lloyd’s, 
(re)insurance members work together in 88 ‘syndicates’ in order to jointly (re)insure 
risks, and thus creating a pooling of risks. Often, different syndicates would subscribe to 
a single (re)insured risk and take on a certain share of that risk.  
This institutional set-up enables large single risks to find (re)insurance. Whereas Lloyd’s 
pool of syndicates would generally reinsure existing insurance contracts, Lloyd’s might 
also become active as an insurer. As an example of such insurance, the Irish ICS 
(Investor Compensation Company Limited, ICCL) has concluded its ‘excess of loss’ 
insurance through Lloyd’s. 
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3.2. Comparing the Basic Model with current insurance supply 
3.2.1. Existing insurance coverage vs. Basic Model 
Existing insurance products do not easily fit the Basic Model described above.  
Firstly, there is an imperfect match of insured events. Whereas crime insurance might 
insure fraud, pecuniary loss liability insurance does not necessarily cover for administrative 
malpractice, operational error or bad advice. 
Secondly, neither crime insurance nor pecuniary loss liability insurance are related to the 
failure of an insured entity.  
Under the Basic Model, ICS are to compensate only if the investment firm is not able to 
repay money or to return assets as a consequence of for instance fraud. Hence, insurance 
contracts which are to (partly) replace ICS’ payment obligations enter at a later stage than 
those comparable insurances existing on the market.  
Thirdly, existing crime and/or pecuniary loss liability insurances rarely concern events 
which cause damage to a very large number of persons. This is very different in an ICS 
context where the insured event (e.g. fraud) can affect thousands of customers of an 
investment firm. 
Table 3: Existing insurance coverage vs. Basic Model events 
Basic Model Events May be covered by the 
following existing 
insurances 
Differences between currently 
available insurance and 
insurance in an ICS-context 
fraud crime insurance 
- administrative 
malpractice 
- operational error 
- bad advice 
pecuniary loss liability 
insurance 
- In an ICS-context, insurances 
cover damage only when the 
insured event leads to the 
investment firms’ inability to pay 
back money/assets. 
- In an ICS-context, insurances 
might have a very large external 
dimension (covering damages of all 
customers of an investment firms). 
Source:  CEP/Bigus. 
As can be seen in the box below, the United Kingdom is the only one Member State that 
decided to extent the coverage of its ICS to include bad advice. 
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Box 4: UK experience with coverage for damages caused by bad advice 
Experience with covering bad advice in the UK 
The British ICS (‘Financial Services Compensation Scheme or FSCS’) implicitly covers 
bad advice. It provides coverage if an UK authorised investment firm in default has 
caused a financial loss to an investor by breaching civil liability owed by the firm to the 
claimant (so-called civil liability test). Hence, the breach of every kind of contract 
obligation resulting in a loss to an investor triggers compensation. In many cases, this 
comes down to cases of bad advice.  
Hence, the FSCS must provide coverage even in cases where a financial instrument can 
still be returned to the investor but has lost in value. This deviates from Article 2 (2) 
sub-para. 2 of the ICSD which only provides coverage if the investment firm is unable 
to repay investors’ money or to return investors’ financial instruments. 
In fact, the UK regulation allows for an investor protection that goes beyond the ICSD’s 
minimum standard. As a result, the British FSCS has to provide coverage in a 















* in 2002/2003 89% of these failures resulted in bad advice 
 
3.2.2. Average cost of existing insurance coverage vs. ICS costs 
Although there are certain similarities between existing insurance contracts and the type of 
insurance contracts necessary to cover the ICS Basic Model, it is nonetheless not useful to 
compare the average cost of crime or pecuniary loss liability insurance with current average 
contributions to ICS for the following reasons: 
a) ICS today do not compensate according to the Basic Model (see chapter 2.1.1). 
b) Depending on the Member State, national ICS offer different levels of protection as the 
ICSD only prescribes a minimum level of compensation (initially EUR 20,000; now 
EUR 100,000). Spain had introduced a protection level of EUR 100,000; France of 
EUR 70,000, the UK of GBP 50,000 (and implicitly covers ‘bad advice’), Slovakia of 
EUR 50,000 and Greece of EUR 30,000.30 Such different levels of protection make it 
difficult to aggregate ICS contributions. 
                                          
29 European Commission (2010b), Impact Assessment to the ICSD proposal; p. 106 et seq. using data from 
Oxera (2005b). 
30 See European Commission (2010b) at page 22. 
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c) Existing insurance contracts may cover damage up to a level which is very different 
from the ICSD level. 
d) ICS's contributions are strongly influenced by the national legal provisions and the 
financing policy of the ICS. These are very different amongst ICS, as the present ICSD 
practically entails no rules on the actual financing of ICS. Therefore it is problematic to 
aggregate ICS contributions or compare them with market prices for existing 
insurances. For example: an ICS with an ex ante financing can be expected to charge 
much higher regular contributions than an ICS applying ex post financing. Moreover, 
contributions to ex ante ICS are very different, too (for instance depending on the past 
failures which members have to cover). Responses to a questionnaire sent to 
European ICS show that average yearly contributions to ex ante financed ICS vary 
from below EUR 6,500 to EUR 110,000 per scheme member.  
3.3. Current and past use of private insurance contracts by ICS 
and/or investment firms 
Neither the ICSD dating back from 1997 nor the current proposal by the European 
Commission amending the ICSD explicitly provide for the use of insurance contracts in 
order to (partially) provide compensation to clients of investment firms which cannot meet 
their obligations.31 But as the ICSD does not exclude it either, until today, it has been a 
matter of national implementation of the ICSD, respectively national law (as well as of 
market forces and choices made by ICS and investment firms), whether or not ICS and/or 
investment firms are allowed to apply private insurance contracts and in how far these can 
substitute ICS contributions. The following chapter presents a selection of countries (both 
Member States and third countries) where insurance solutions are - or have been - in 
place. 
At the same time, it should be kept in mind that a considerable number of investment firms 
has taken out professional indemnity insurance as a result of European regulatory 
provisions. Investment firms authorised only to give investment advice and/or to receive 
and transmit investors’ orders without holding investors’ money or securities must have 
 an initial capital of EUR 50,000; 
 a professional indemnity insurance covering all Member States or a comparable 
guarantee representing at least EUR 1 million applying to each claim and in 
aggregate EUR 1.5 million per year for all claims or 
 a combination of both.32 
Furthermore, investment firms which do hold investors’ money or securities must have a 
certain (higher) amount of initial capital. 33  Investment firms which do not deal in any 
                                          
31 Full replacement of contributions to ICS by private insurance under the current ICSD seems only a hypothetical 
option since the Directive makes the existence of an ICS and membership for investment firms mandatory.  
32 Article 7 in connection with Article 3 (1) (b) (iii) of the Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions (recast). See 
also Article 31 (1) of proposed CRD IV (Proposal COM(2011) 453 for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions and investment firms and amending Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in 
a financial conglomerate) in connection with Article 4 (8) (c) of proposed CRR (Proposal COM(2011) 452 for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on prudential requirements for credit institutions and 
investment firms). 
33 In general, investment firms must have capital of at least EUR 730,000; Article 9 of the Directive 2006/49/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms 
and credit institutions (recast). See also Article 28 (2) of the proposed CRD IV (Proposal COM(2011) 453 
above). 
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financial instruments for their own account but offer certain services must have a lower 
amount of initial capital.34 
Below we take a closer look at different insurance solutions in a number of Member States. 
We focus on Ireland which shows the most developed insurance scenario. In addition, we 
added South Africa and Canada as non-EU countries in order to gather additional insights 
about different ways to deal with ICS alternatives. 
3.3.1. Ireland 
The Irish ICS (‘Investor Compensation Company Limited’, ICCL) has taken out insurance to 
cover losses that exceed the scheme's reserves. The Investor Compensation Act (1998) 
provides for the legal basis to do so.35 This ‘excess of loss’ insurance provides coverage for 
claims exceeding EUR 15 million. The compensation scheme has two separate funds, Fund 
A and Fund B. While Fund A comprises credit institutions, stockbrokers and authorised 
investment firms, Fund B covers multi-agency intermediaries, authorised advisers and 
insurance agents.36 For Fund A, the upper liability cap is EUR 65 million (meaning insurance 
coverage of up to EUR 50 million), whereas it is EUR 25 million for Fund B (insurance 
coverage up to EUR 10 million). This difference is a result of ‘differences in business 
models’ and of the lower relative premium which Fund B participants have to pay.37 This 
means that, although there are more Fund B participants (5,233 in 2011) compared to 
Fund A participants (222 in 2011), the total annual contributions to Fund A (EUR 3.5 
million) are larger than those of Fund B (EUR 1.7 million). 
The first insurance contract has been concluded by ICCL in 2010 and covered a one-year 
period beginning in October that year. On 1 October 2010, ICCL paid its first premium 
which summed up to EUR 305,000 (Fund A: EUR 265,000 and Fund B: EUR 40,000).38 The 
contract has then been renewed for another year (to October 2012). ICCL is currently 
seeking renewal of its insurance. 
                                          
34 In general they will need EUR 125,000; Article 5 (1) of the Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions (recast). 
See also Article 29 (1) of the proposed CRD IV (Proposal COM(2011) 453 above). 
35  Investor Compensation Act (1998) Section 12: ‘The Company (“ICCL”) shall have the power to do anything 
which appears to it to be requisite, advantageous or incidental to, or which appears to it to facilitate, either 
directly or indirectly, the performance by it of its functions as specified in this Act or in its memorandum of 
association’. 
36 List of type of participants in each fund of the Irish ICS see http://www.investorcompensation.ie/funds.php. 
37 ICCL (2011), Annual Report, p. 17. 
38 ICCL (2011), Annual Report, p. 17, 22, 23. 
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Table 4: Key figures of the Irish Investor Compensation Scheme’s insurance 
ICCL Fund A Fund B Total 
Participants (2011) 222 5,233 5,455 
Total contributions (2011 in EUR) 3.5m 1.7m 5.2m 
Average contribution per participant (2011 in EUR) 15,766 325 953 
Standing funds (2011 in EUR) 22m 17.8m 39.8m 
Liability floor (in EUR) 15m 15m - 
Liability cap (in EUR) 65m 25m - 
Insurance cost (2010/2011 in EUR) 265,000 40,000 305,000 
Compensation costs (2010/2011 in EUR) 31,045 - 31,045 
Source:  ICCL (2011). 
The insurance solution of the ICS in Ireland is unique in the EU. However, prior to the 
decision by ICCL to buy insurance, there were many discussions on whether it really is a 
feasible and profitable solution. The Morrogh Working Group, which was established by the 
Irish Minister of Finance in 2004, commented in 2006: ‘The group is satisfied that insurance 
is not considered to be economically viable and it is not recommended on that basis’. It 
explained its judgement with the need to make an in-depth analysis of the risks associated 
with the participants of the ICS that it deemed to be too costly.39 ICCL itself has been 
sceptical of taking out insurance as well. In 2009, ICCL claimed it to be ‘not [...] feasible’ to 
buy insurance as the scheme would have to make a detailed risk and actuarial assessment. 
Furthermore, there has been a lack of loss history data to assess the probability of damage 
events. What is more, the ICS existed only for a short period of time which made it 
impossible for insurance undertakings to foresee the frequency of loss occurrence in the 
future, and as a result, an adequate, risk-sensitive pricing of insurance contracts was not 
realisable.40 
In spite of all these challenges, ICCL tried to obtain such insurance for a couple of years. 
However, with these obstacles in mind, it proved to be not viable to purchase such cover 
until 2010. Eventually, ICCL made use of the services of an insurance agent.41 This agent 
directly negotiated with the lead Lloyds’ underwriters and provided them with extensive 
information on the structure of the Irish market and the applicable legislation. This led to 
the ICCL being able to purchase insurance coverage in the end. 
3.3.2. Austria 
The Austrian Securities Supervision Act (Wertpapieraufsichtsgesetz, WAG) states that a 
pure ICS (in practice: only the Anlegerentschädigung von Wertpapierfirmen GmbH, AeW) 
has to refer to an insurance policy or to bank guarantees whenever the funding level of the 
scheme is below 5% of the total revenues of all of its members in a year. The insurance or 
bank guarantee has to provide coverage for ‘the difference between the funding cap of 5% 
and the contributions already paid’. The WAG explicitly states that losses stemming from 
criminal conduct shall be covered by the insurance policy (respectively by the bank 
                                          
39 Final Report of the Morrogh Working Group, p. 47, October 2006. 
40 ICCL (2009), p. 13, 22. 
41 ICCL made use of the services of Robertson Low Insurances Ltd. 
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guarantees). The yearly contributions paid by the ICS members serve in part (max. 50%) 
as means to take out the insurance or bank guarantees.42 
AeW concluded an insurance covering fraud at member investment firms in the year 2009. 
The insurance contract has a liability cap of EUR 1 million per case and comes at a cost for 
the ICS of about EUR 125,000 each year. 
3.3.3. Greece 
The Greek ICS (Hellenic Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund, HDIGF) has taken out 
insurance at the beginning of the century, but it terminated the insurance, since it 
considered it as being too expensive.43 
3.3.4. Lithuania 
The Lithuanian ICS (Liabilities to Investors Insurance Fund) has taken out insurance from 
2005 to 2010. It covered 16 investors. The insurance was vested with a liability cap of 
EUR 56,000. There have been two reasons for the cancelation of the insurance coverage: 
i) a bankruptcy proceeding against a brokerage firm, and ii) a fraud case. 
3.3.5. Germany 
Unlike the model the Irish ICS chose, the German compensatory fund of securities trading 
companies (Entschädigungseinrichtung der Wertpapierhandelsunternehmen, EdW) opted 
for a solution in which the investment firms themselves can take out private insurance 
against pecuniary loss in exchange for a discount on their contributions to the ICS. This 
option, which is a voluntary one, exists since August 2009.44 
In case members of EdW (investment firms and those credit institutions that carry out 
solely investment business activities, i.e. no deposit taking) hold crime cover insurance, the 
stipulated ex ante annual premium is reduced by 15%. However, the contribution discount 
is only granted where certain conditions are met. The crime cover insurance must meet the 
following conditions:45 
 The insurance must cover losses caused by a 'trust person' (e.g. an employee) of 
the investment firm with intentional illicit conduct. 
 There is a legal obligation to pay compensation due to intentional illicit conduct. 
 The insurance comprises each and every employee of the investment firm, including 
the management body. 
 The sum insured is not less than EUR 1 million. 
 There is a deductible, i.e. a part of the damage which the investment firm has to 
pay, of at least 10% and 20% maximum. 
 Whenever a trust person causes damage to the detriment of the firm, the insurance 
has to cover such losses (‘direct damage’). If the trust person harms a third party 
for whom the investment firm is liable, the insurance has to provide compensation 
as well (‘indirect damage’). 
                                          
42 § 76 paragraph 1c Wertpapieraufsichtsgesetz 2007(WAG). 
43 Page 59 Vierte EdWBeitrV. 
44 (German) Vierte Verordnung zur Änderung der Verordnung über die Beiträge zu der Entschädigungseinrichtung 
der Wertpapierhandelsunternehmen bei der Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (VierteEdWBeitrV, 
17 August 2009). 
45 § 2d VierteEdWBeitrV. 
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3.3.6. Spain 
In Spain, between 2001 and 2002, asset managers could partially substitute ICS 
membership by private insurance. However, as a number of problems occurred, this 
possibility has been subsequently deleted. According to the Spanish ICS, the main 
problems have been: i) a limited insurance offer, in part due to limited knowledge of 
investment firms’ business on the side of insurance undertakings, ii) difficulties between 
investment firms and insurance undertakings as to reach agreement on the scope of risks 
covered by insurance, and iii) insurance policies being expensive.  
3.3.7. Sweden 
In Sweden neither the ICS nor the investment firms have taken out any insurance. 
However, the ICS (Investerarskyddet) is in principle allowed to buy insurance cover. 
3.3.8. Italy 
The Italian ICS (Fondo Nazionale di Garanzia) is legally able to buy insurance cover; 
however, it did not choose to do so until now. In case the ICS would decide to take out 
insurance, the participants of the scheme would be required to share the insurance costs.46 
3.3.9. Finland 
The Finnish ICS (Sijoittajien Korvausrahasto) is required by law to have a minimum level of 
EUR 12 million of funds available. Roughly one third of that amount has to be held in cash 
deposits and is financed by ex ante contribution by its members (in 2010 EUR 5.64 million 
was held in cash deposits). According to the ICS rules, the rest of the capital requirement 
(EUR 7.8 million) has to be covered either by taking out insurance or by committing to 
credit lines. As a consequence, ICS members do not have to pay any ‘usual’ ex ante 
contributions if the cash deposits exceed the amount of EUR 4.2 million; however, they 
have to pay contributions so that the ICS is able to take out insurance or refer to credit 
guarantees. 
Sijoittajien Korvausrahasto has chosen not to refer to any kind of insurance policy.47 The 
scheme stated in the annual report in 2004: ‘Covering the minimum capital by means of a 
credit commitment is substantially [more] advantageous than by means of an insurance’. 
Insurance turned out to be too expensive. Therefore it decided to refer to credit lines that 
amounted to EUR 8.5 million in 2004.48 
3.3.10. Malta 
Besides borrowing or otherwise incurring indebtedness, the ICS in Malta is allowed to take 
out insurance ‘for the purposes of the scheme’s functions’. However, borrowing is limited to 
30% of the ICS’s net asset value. 
In addition, whenever a member of the ICS holds professional indemnity insurance (or a 
similar arrangement) the compensation paid by the scheme in case of a loss event is to be 
reduced. The respective provision states that ‘the Management Committee [...] shall take 
into account any payments made under a policy of professional indemnity insurance’. 
                                          
46 Oxera (2005b), at p. 123 and 77; Article 17 of bylaws to Article 15 of Law no. 1 of 2 January 1991, National 
Compensation Fund, December 2011. 
47 2004 has been the first year the Finish ICS was legally able to obtain credit lines. Prior to that year, the ICS 
actually held an insurance policy. 
48 Sijoittajien Korvausrahasto (2004a); Sijoittajien Korvausrahasto (2008), Section 15 and 15a; Oxera (2005b), 
Appendix, p. 32.  
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Therefore the Committee has to reduce the compensation payment of the ICS to the 
affected investor by the amount such insurance is paying.49 
3.3.11. United Kingdom 
Although the British ICS (Financial Services Compensation Scheme, FSCS) does not use 
insurance policies, national regulations explicitly provide for them: ‘FSCS may consider 
obtaining insurance cover, if available, if the risk that the value of claims FSCS pays out 
exceeds the levy limits of [...] particular classes or sub-classes.’ 50  This has also been 
addressed in a 2006 Discussion Paper of the FSA stressing that insurance ‘could be an 
attractive way of smoothing costs and pricing risks before passing them on to the industry’ 
for ICS.51 Furthermore, the FSCS may oblige its members to finance the costs of such 
insurance with a management expenses levy.52 
Just recently in July 2012, the FSA has published a consultation paper,53 focussing on the 
key elements of the current funding model for the FSCS. Although the consultation paper 
discussed some changes to FSCS’ funding, it essentially proposes to maintain the current 
funding model. Insurance policies do not play a role in the consultation paper. 
3.3.12. Canada 
The Canadian Investor Compensation Scheme (Canada Investor Protection Fund, CIPF) has 
taken out an ‘excess of loss’ insurance in mid-2007 with a liability floor of CAD 100 million 
and a liability cap of CAD 200 million.54 CIPF's reason to do so has been a strong increase 
in net equity of its members. 
In 2010 CIPF decided to prolong the insurance contract. Whereas it left liability floor and 
liability cap unchanged, it reduced the insured sum from CAD 100 million to CAD 70 million. 
In 2011 the liability floor was set again at CAD 100 million whereas the liability cap was 
increased up to CAD 226 million, resulting in an insurance coverage of CAD 116 million. In 
addition to the external insurance coverage, the Canadian ICS increased its general fund 
balance by resorting to lines of credit (see table below). 
As can be seen in the table as well, the expenses of CIPF for lines of credit and for the 
‘excess of loss’ insurance have increased steadily between 2006 – the year before CIPF 
decided to take out insurance – and 2011,from CAD 180,000 to CAD 1,141,000.55 
                                          
49 Maltese Regulation on Investor compensation scheme, Legal Notice 368 of 2003; as last amended by Legal 
Notice 62 of 2011, Article 6 paragraph 3, Article 21. 
50 Financial Services Authority - FSA (2012a), Section 6.1.16A. 
51 Financial Services Authority - FSA (2006), Section 6.11, p. 31. 
52 Financial Services Authority - FSA (2006), Section 6.1.10. 
53 Financial Services Authority - FSA (2012b), Consultation Paper CP12/16. 
54 CIPF exists since 1969. It has approximately 200 members and there have been 18 insolvencies since its 
establishment leading to a total amount of compensation of CAD 36 million. If there are claims by the 
customers of member institutions that are less or equal to CAD 100 million a year, the ICS is obliged to pay 
full compensation. If the total claim exceeds CAD 100 million a year, the insurance has to take cover 
compensation payments of up to CAD 100 million. 
55 Canadian Investor Protection Fund (2008), p. 1, 4, 6, 11; Canadian Investor Protection Fund (2009), p. 4, 6, 
10; Canadian Investor Protection Fund (2010), p. 7, 11; Canadian Investor Protection Fund (2011), p. 8, 10, 
13, 19; Canadian Investor Protection Fund (2012), p. 4, 14; and Canadian Investor Protection Fund (2011b), 
p. 4, 11. 
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Table 5: Funding and Expenses of the Canadian ICS (CIPF) 
CIPF funding 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
General fund balance in CAD million - 313 346 359 382 409 
Lines of credit in CAD million - 100 100 100 100 125 
‘Excess of loss’ insurance cover in 
CAD million  
- 100 100 100 70 116 
Total fund balance in CAD million - 513 546 559 552 650 
Expenses 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Expenses for lines of credit and 
insurance in CAD 1000 
180* 455.2 592.8 927.7 1,028.5 1,141.8 
Source:  Canadian Investor Protection Fund (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012). 
Note:  *without insurance. 
Moreover, while the CIPF provides coverage for up to CAD 1 million per customer per 
investment undertaking, a member of CIPF may buy insurance to secure client’s losses that 
go beyond the CAD 1 million threshold. This ‘extra’ protection is voluntary. Thus, members 
of the scheme can decide whether or not and at which level they offer this additional 
coverage to their clients. 
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3.3.13. South Africa 
The ICS in South Africa has chosen to rely on a type of crime insurance named ‘Universal 
crime bond policy’. This is basically a crime insurance concluded by the ICS for all of its 
members. All custodians have to pay risk-adjusted contributions to cover the costs of the 
insurance policy. Cost coverage is also provided by interest made out of investments of the 
scheme.56 






substitute to ICS 
Insurance 
taken out by 
ICS 
Insurance taking 
by ICS possible 
as an option in 
national law. 
Insurance taking by ICS 
foreseen as an obligation  
(given certain 
conditions) in national 
law 
Ireland     
Austria 
(AeW)  
   
Greece  
 
(in the past)   
Lithuania  
 
(in the past)   
Germany 
(EdW) 
    
Spain  
(in the past) 
   
Sweden     
Italy     
Finland     
Malta     
UK     
Source:  CEP/Bigus. 
                                          
56 Panagora Consulting (2010). 
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4. FULL REPLACEMENT OF ICS BY PRIVATE INSURANCE 
CONTRACTS CONCLUDED BY SERVICE PROVIDERS 
KEY FINDINGS 
 A full replacement of investor compensation schemes (ICS) by private insurance taken 
out by the investment firms has the following benefits:   
1. It will improve risk assessment and risk controlling since insurers have strong 
incentives to charge risk-sensitive premiums (most ICS currently do not).  
2. Risk-sensitive charges will improve the investment firm’s incentives and will 
improve competition. 
 There is a conditional benefit: Risk diversification will only improve if insurers have 
larger pools of investment firms with similar risks. 
 There are also disadvantages:   
1. Insurers may have – at least temporarily – a lack of quantitative data and, 
additionally, less expertise on investment industry than ICS do which impairs risk 
assessment and risk controlling.  
2. Insurers will ask for actuarial risk assessments. Fixed costs of risk assessment may 
drive small investment firms out of the market.   
3. Insurers need to earn a profit margin, ICS not necessarily.   
4. Insurers may care less about reputational capital of the investment industry which 
is important in damage cases which are not clear from a legal point of view. 
 If insurers are not willing to offer unlimited coverage per investment firm – which is 
likely – an ICS is still necessary. In this case, additional problems might occur (e.g. 
double risk monitoring and assessment, frictions in damage compensation) which are 
discussed in more detail with partial replacement of ICS (chapter 5.). 
 Alternatively, the ICS itself may buy insurance cover for damages incurred by its 
investment firms. From an economic perspective, this could make sense if there is an 
‘excess of loss’ insurance which only covers damages exceeding a specific amount 
('floor', like for instance EUR 15 million in Ireland) up to another specific threshold 
('cap', e.g. EUR 50 million in Ireland). In this situation, there is an insurance effect: 
benefiting from the insurers’ and ICS’ comparative benefits without distorting 
incentives too much.  
 Risk diversification will be improved if several insurers together provide insurance for 
the ICS (as actually is the case in Ireland) or for large investment firms. But such 
insurance pools tend to reduce competition between insurers. 
 For a variety of reasons, the willingness of insurance undertakings to offer full private 
insurance to investment firms covering all four events of the Basic Model is close to 
zero. Allowing for liability caps only slightly increases the likelihood of supply of such 
insurances and comes at the cost of cover falling below the levels of the (ICSD) 
Directive . 
 Data suggests that for investment firms, even private insurance contracts with a 
liability cap of EUR 5 million covering all four events of the Basic Model on average 
come at a significantly higher cost than ICS membership. However, given a number of 
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methodological problems, this fact does not allow us to draw any conclusions on the 
efficiency of neither private insurances nor ICS. 
 Given lack of sufficient empirical data and sufficiently reliable answers to our 
questionnaires, we are not able to conclude on the economic usefulness of ‘excess of 
loss’ insurances by ICS.  
 From a legal point of view, 'mandatory insurance' seem achievable by imposing an 
insurance obligation on investment firms, rather than an obligation to offer insurance 
on insurance undertakings. Purchasing insurance might prove difficult to ex-post 
financed ICS. Winding down ICS and replacing them in full by private insurances 
creates a number of legal challenges. ICS deny the role of judging whether a private 
insurance brought forward by an investment firms might offer cover comparable to the 
ICS.  
4.1. Introduction 
4.1.1. Full versus partial insurance, mandatory versus voluntary insurance 
Insurance coverage can differ at least across two dimensions. Insurance contracts may 
partially or fully take over the risks from the ICS. With full insurance, all four Basic Model 
events (fraud, administrative malpractice, operational error and bad advice) are taken 
over, for a perfect match without any restriction, e.g. no application of a cap. With partial 
insurance, the insurer only pays damages related to a subset of these four risk events, for 
instance, fraud and administrative malpractice (or it applies a cap). The ICS has to take 
over the remaining risks then (e.g. the risks related to operational error and bad advice).  
Another important question is whether there should be mandatory or voluntary insurance. 
Only in the mandatory scenario, all investment firms (including banks engaging in 
investment services) must buy insurance.57 The scenario of voluntary insurance reflects the 
current situation. In the case that insurance contracts fully replace ICS coverage, we 
assume this to be realistic – if at all – only under a mandatory insurance scheme. 
Consequently, there are three options: 
 full and mandatory insurance, 
 partial and mandatory insurance, 
 partial and voluntary insurance. 
Ideally, there is coverage for all investors of a failing investment firm or bank, regardless of 
the number of investors. However, with a big investment firm or a large bank engaging in 
investment activities an insurer might be unwilling to offer unlimited coverage. Usually, 
insurers do limit coverage. If so, an ICS might be necessary even in the case of full and 
mandatory insurance for damages exceeding the limit (see chapter 4.2.4).  
Finally, one can distinguish between the cases where the insurer contracts with the 
investment firm directly or with the ICS. Generally, we assume contracts with the 
investment firm. There is a separate chapter on insurance contracts taken out by the ICS 
(see chapter 4.2.5). 
                                          
57  We generally use the term investment firm also for banks/credit institutions engaging in investment activities. 
If we want to show differences between these two types of financial institutions, we will use the term ‘bank’. 
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4.1.2. Risk types and its drivers 
There are four types of risks (‘events’) to be covered: fraud, administrative malpractice, 
operational errors and bad advice according to the EP's resolution on which the Basic Model 
is based. The EP's resolution is silent on burden of proof but does not indicate that a 
deviation from the initial ICS set-up was intended where investors do not need to prove 
intentional behaviour and causation, but only that they have a claim which is due against 
the investment firm. As this is to the advantage of investors, this burden of proof set-up is 
part of the assumed Basic Model (even though it is not clarified in the EP's resolution). 
According to our interpretation, fraud risk addresses investors’ losses from criminal 
offences by the investment firm or its employees, e.g. by theft, fraud in the narrow sense 
and defalcation. Whereas fraud refers to penal/criminal law, the other three risk types 
(administrative malpractice, operational errors and bad advice) are rather related to 
tort/civil law. However, all four risk types might be interpreted differently in different 
jurisdictions. Consequently, the probability of coverage by insurers might differ across 
countries as well. 
Again, according to our assumed Basic Model scenario, investors only need to prove that a 
valid and due claim against the investment firm/bank exists. Administrative malpractice 
reflects an investment firm’s or its employee's negligent behaviour in executing investors’ 
orders. Bad advice by the investment firm or by its employees may induce an investor to 
take the wrong investment, selling or holding decisions. Operational errors in the 
investment firm can cause damages to investors. Examples are flaws in internal processing 
or in information systems.  
Potential drivers influencing the probability and/or size of damages are: 
 whether the investment firm is authorised to hold client assets or not. For firms 
being authorised to handle clients' assets, it is easier and more tempting to commit 
fraud and operational errors might be more likely as well; 
 whether the investment firm is authorised to trade securities for their own account 
or not. Trading for own account may increase the risk of huge losses. Huge losses 
will impair the value of other assets and may even induce risky (malpractice) or 
even fraudulent behaviour, e.g. in order to hide losses; 
 whether it is an investment firm or a bank engaging in investment services. Banks 
are often more complex and it might be easier to commit fraud. On the other hand, 
banks are better able to diversify risks due to a broader scope of businesses. Banks 
also face stricter rules on reporting and disclosure and higher capital requirements; 
 whether there is an (efficient) internal control system which is aimed to reduce 
fraud risks but also to avoid/diminish operational errors and malpractice; 
 whether the size of the investment firm is big or small. Larger financial institutions 
are more likely to have higher exposures and, thus, higher damages. 
4.2. Economic issues 
4.2.1. General economic criteria 
In order to evaluate whether full or partial insurance might be desirable form an economic 
point of view, we have to address the consequences for the parties’ incentives, for risk 
assessment and controlling, for risk diversification and risk allocation, for administrative 
costs, competition and other costs and benefits.  
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Box 5: Economic criteria to evaluate costs and benefits of insurance contracts 
Economic criteria to evaluate the cost and benefits of insurance contracts 
• Incentives for insurance undertakings, ICS and investors, 
• Risk assessment and risk controlling of investment firms by insurance undertakings 
and ICS, 
• Risk diversification and risk allocation of insurance undertakings and ICS, 
• Administrative costs (including costs of damage compensation) of insurance 
undertakings and ICS, 
• Effects on competition. 
Incentives: Investor compensation and/or insurance will affect the behaviour of insurers, 
investment firms and the ICS. The effect on investors’ incentives is negligible as retail 
investors are not likely and not in a position to carefully screen and monitor an investment 
firm. The insurance should be designed in a way to provide the right incentives to 
investment firms in order to reduce moral hazard problems which may increase the 
likelihood and/or the size of potential damages. In principle, investment firms should pay 
for the expected costs which they may impose on the system.58 While an insurance in itself 
generally distorts the investment firm’s incentives, risk-sensitive charges or deductibles59 
usually mitigate such distortions. 
Risk assessment and risk controlling: Insurers and ICS need to have appropriate 
incentives in order to reduce the likelihood and/or the size of potential damages by proper 
risk assessment and risk controlling. The investment firm’s risk needs to be properly 
screened and monitored to ensure efficient pricing of insurance/ICS charges which in turn 
helps to improve incentives of the investment firm. Whereas risk assessment requires the 
collection and processing of information, risk controlling implies to take appropriate action 
based on this information, e.g. raising or lowering the charges. There are other tools such 
as more frequent audits and contracts which ask the investment firm to e.g. install trading 
book limits or an (effective) internal control system or to perform risk hedging activities. 
Proper risk assessment and risk controlling depend on both, the knowledge/qualification 
and the incentives of insurers and ICS. Generally speaking, an insurance system should be 
designed in such a way that it provides better incentives than when being without one. As a 
matter of principle, an insurance contract will always distort the incentives of the insurance 
beneficiary who then does not have to bear in full the consequences of damages. The 
challenge is to find an insurance contract which minimises distortions of incentives. 
Risk diversification: This point addresses the question whether there are enough 
investment firms with similar risks in the ICS or insurance pool. Portfolio theory suggests a 
minimum number of about 30-50 single risks in a portfolio to ensure sufficient risk 
diversification.60 The heavier the expected systemic effects are, the bigger the portfolio 
(insurance pool) should be; which means that more single risks (investment firms) should 
be included in the insurance pool. Risk diversification and insurance work best if potential 
damages are quite similar across investment firms. Thus, if there are a few very large 
investment firms with high risk exposure, it will be difficult to find insurance on the basis of 
unlimited coverage. If insurers and ICS both cover the investment firms' risks one needs to 
make sure that the portfolios are both sufficiently large and sufficiently homogenous in 
terms of risk exposure. 
                                          
58 Oxera (2006), p. 29. 
59 Deductibles are small damages paid by the investment firm (or the ICS if the ICS buys the insurance). 
60 See Markowitz, and also Brealey et al., p. 144. 
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Risk allocation: considers risk-sharing and risk-shifting issues. Risk-sharing addresses the 
question how many insurers besides the ICS bear the investment firms’ risk and whether 
they bear it more or less equally. Risk-shifting relates to mechanisms which allocate high or 
low risks differently between the insurers and the ICS. From an economic point of view, 
higher or more risk should be allocated to the party for which it is less costly to bear it. 
Administrative costs: contain the costs of risk assessment and risk controlling, but also 
the profit margins that insurers will have to realise in order to meet their shareholders’ 
required return. Last, but not least, administrative costs include the transaction costs of 
damage compensation, such as cost of administering the payout, possibly lawyer and court 
fees etc. Such costs may increase if there are quarrels on whether the ICS or the insurer 
has to compensate or whether the insurer has to pay at all. Further, investors may not 
know to whom to address a claim, causing cost for distributing information or re-directing 
requests. Obviously, administrative costs should be as low as possible. 
Competition: This criterion requires that the insurance (and ICS) charges should not 
distort market structures but rather be related to the expected costs that the investment 
firm imposes on the system. 61  It is obvious that a less risky firm should pay lower 
insurance charges than a high-risk one. However, imposing risk-adjusted charges may 
raise the market entry costs of smaller investment firms. Competition addresses the 
insurance market, too. State-owned insurance may distort the market structure as well, 
e.g. by inefficient pricing.  
Other costs and benefits: Systemic effects represent an important type of cost which we 
will deal with in more detail in chapter 6. Changes in the regulatory environment might 
impair (but also improve) the reputational capital of institutions. For instance, if an ICS has 
a long history of only few damage claims, investors will attach a reputation of efficient risk 
assessment and risk controlling to the ICS. An insurance firm needs to establish and 
maintain this reputation. One benefit of partial or mandatory insurance might be that the 
information on insurance premiums could be useful to supervisory agencies and/or to the 
ICS or even the investors (if disclosed).  
There is tension between some of those criteria.62 The more risks can be pooled (by an 
insurer or by the ICS) the better will be risk diversification and the lower might be 
administrative costs. However, better pooling also implies that the investment firm bears 
less responsibility such that incentives are more likely to get distorted. The more refined 
risk assessment and risk controlling are, the better the incentives for investment firms are. 
However, administrative costs are likely to increase as well. 
4.2.2. Potential benefits of full mandatory insurance compared to the current 
situation (no full insurance) 
The full mandatory insurance scenario implies that insurers bear all four types of ‘event’ 
risk in an unlimited way, so that it is not necessary anymore to maintain an ICS. One 
important benefit of full insurance might be improved risk diversification if the insurers 
have larger pools of investment firms than ICS have. This is more likely to happen with a 
lower number of insurers, that is, with a more concentrated insurance market. For 
instance, let us assume hypothetically that there are 300 investment firms and ten ICS 
where each ICS has 30 investment firms. If there are four insurers taking over 75 
investment firms each, the pools increase and risk diversification tends to improve. 
Whether this is the case, also depends on whether there are a few investment firms with 
outstanding size in the pool. If this is the case, risk diversification may not improve. 
                                          
61  Oxera (2006), p. 29. 
62  Oxera (2006), p. 31. 
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Highest total payout 
for a failure 1999-
2009 in million EUR 
Average payout per 
failure 1999-2003 in 
million EUR 
Austria (AeW) 885 1 Current estimate: 11 11 
Belgium 138 1 2.6 2.6 
Bulgaria n.a. 0 (2004-2009) 0 (2004-2009) 0 (2004-2009) 
Cyprus 28 0 0 0 
Czech Republic 70 15 56 n.a. 
Denmark 220 1 1.6 1.6 
Estonia 18 0 0 0 
Finland 376 0 0 0 
France 374 0 (1999-2003) no data 2004-2009 n.a. 
Germany (EdW) 1,023 18 Current estimate: 260 0.2 
Greece 130 9 2.2 n.a. 
Hungary 58 13 (1999-2003) n.a. 1.3 (1999-2003) 
Ireland 230 3 Expected: less than 8.5 about 3.2 
Italy 961 15 5.7 0.8 
Latvia 26 0 - - 
Lithuania 32 1 0.06 0.06 
Luxemburg 218 0 0 0 
Malta 44 0 0 0 
Netherlands 337 6 0.1 (until 2009)  0.09 
Poland 39 1 7.6 7.6 
Portugal 76 0 0 0 
Romania n.a. 0 (2004-2009) 0 (2004-2009) 0 (2004-2009) 
Slovakia 40 0 0 0 
Slovenia 29 0 0 0 
Spain (FOGAIN) 350 5 31.8 4.2 
Sweden 208 1 n.a. n.a. 
United Kingdom 3,850 1,608 (1999-03) 23 (1999-2003) 0.35 (2000-2003) 
Sources:  Oxera (2005a), p. 20-21, 41, 79, 125, 130. European Commission (2010b), p.106-108, www.e-d-w.de 
(31 October 2012), www.aew.at. 
Notes:  n.a.: not available. The schemes in Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, 
Italy, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden, United Kingdom include both 
investment firms and banks. The other schemes address investment firms only (unclear in Bulgaria and 
Romania). In Ireland, 3,360 member firms were not considered, since, according to EU law, they are 
not required to be covered by the scheme. In the UK, the same applies to 3,856 firms. In the UK 
scheme, most cases relate to bad advice, ‘only 1-2% are due to losses resulting from embezzlement or 
theft of client assets’ (Oxera, 2005a, p. 40).  
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There are some ICS, though, which already have a large number of participating 
investment firms and/or banks such that, potentially, there is sufficient risk diversification. 
Examples include the FSCS in United Kingdom, the ICCL in Ireland, the ICS in Italy, and 
the EdW in Germany (members in 2004: 7,706; 3,590; 961; 776).63 However, the EdW is a 
good example where the failure of a huge investment firm with outstanding size (Phoenix 
Kapitaldienst GmbH) caused severe problems for the ICS.64 Damages which occur with a 
failure of a huge investment firm or bank may be too big to be covered by one ICS or one 
insurance undertaking. This is why insurance undertakings usually provide only for limited 
coverage, e.g., with catastrophic risks and car insurance, but also with auditor liability 
insurance. 
Another interesting solution to this problem could be risk pooling (see insurance pools 
within chapter 3.1.2). This may take place either by one (or at least very few) large 
insurance undertaking(s) pooling cover for all big investment firms in Europe. Alternatively, 
several insurance undertakings together may share the risk of a single large investment 
firm. Such model, comparable to Lloyd’s of London (see the Box 3, p. 21) improves risk 
diversification at the risk of diminishing competition amongst insurers). Such risk pooling 
may take place both at the level of ‘first insurance’ and on the level of re-insurance. 
Currently, risk diversification with some ICS is certainly not sufficient (in particular in small 
Member States with several ICS) so that an insurance solution seems more desirable. For 
instance, the banking scheme for Austrian mortgage banks and German public banks only 
includes 12 and 19 banks, respectively.65 Some other schemes have about 60-80 members 
where the level of risk diversification still is improvable (e.g. the Portuguese ICS with 76 
members). Even ICS with many member firms may lack sufficient risk diversification if they 
cover a few firms with outstanding size. Noteworthy, it is not just the amount of members 
that is decisive for risk diversification. In addition, the size of the investment firms and the 
volumes invested matter. 
There might be another benefit assuming that insurers and ICS have the same information 
on the investment firm’s risk.66 Insurers have strong incentives to ask for risk-sensitive 
insurance premiums whereas ICS charges often are not sufficiently based on the 
investment firm’s risk. Indeed, the European Commission reports that only the ICS in 
France considers an explicit risk-weighting (in terms of a probability of default of a firm).67 
Six other countries tie the ICS charges to the firm’s license or business activities. The 
remaining 20 EU Member States do not consider risk aspects. ICS charges are rather based 
on other characteristics such as the value of the financial instruments held or managed, the 
number of clients, the revenues or income generated by investment business, the firm’s 
level of capital, the maximum amount of compensation per client, the average turnover of 
securities sale and purchase transactions and the number of approved persons or traders.68 
Such items do not necessarily reflect well the investment firm’s risk.  
In addition, risk controlling might improve because insurers are keen on avoiding an 
investment firm’s failure. With risk-sensitive charges and proper risk controlling, 
investment firms’ incentives will improve, too, as they are more likely to internalise 
the consequences of risky behaviour which is to the benefit of the whole industry. 
Moreover, risk-sensitive charges reduce cross-subsidisation between firms, i.e. low-risk 
                                          
63 Oxera (2005a), p. 20-21. 
64 Bigus and Leyens (2008). 
65 Oxera (2005a), p. 20-21. 
66 The EP’s Resolution on the basic model does not exclude risk-sensitive insurance charges (or levies), neither 
does the Directive 97/9/EC on ICS. 
67 European Commission (2010b), p. 83-94. 
68 European Commission (2010b) at p. 83. 
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firms paying for high-risk firms. Finally, insurers will ask for charges ex ante, before 
damages happen, whereas now some investor compensation schemes (partly) collect 
charges only after damage occurred. Even though the majority of European ICS is pre-
funded, there are still Member States with some ex post funding.69 It is obvious that an ex 
post scheme provides little incentives to avoid failure. Overall, risk-sensitive charges and 
better risk controlling will enhance competition between investment firms provided that 
they are able to cover the cost attached.  
Two caveats have to be mentioned though, which are linked to each other. Compared to 
the ICS, insurers may have less experience regarding the investment business so that 
risk assessment is likely not to be perfect. Insurers will probably mainly rely on quantitative 
risk indicators also because they may lack qualitative information and the expertise to 
interpret it correctly. For data protection reasons, insurers may also find it difficult to 
acquire this sort of information from supervisory authorities. The same reasons might make 
it more difficult for insurers to find re-insurance. 
Second, if properly done, firm-specific (quantitative) risk-weighting requires considerable 
information gathering which is costly for insurers but also for investment firms (high 
administrative costs). Note that neither the ICSD nor the European Commission’s 
proposal (June 2010) require risk-based fees. The ICCL reports that in the past, it has not 
been able to obtain insurance coverage mainly because the ICCL should have undertaken 
an actuarial assessment and detailed risk analysis of the single investment firms.70 The 
main problem is the lack or unavailability of current and historic risk-sensitive quantitative 
and qualitative firm specific data. In Finland and Greece, the ICS dropped insurance 
contracts because premiums were too costly.71 In a number of Member States ICS are 
already allowed to take out insurance contracts, or are even obliged to do so in certain 
circumstances (see table 6). However, we were unable to find evidence that investment 
firms concluded full insurance contracts. The absence of insurance contracts suggests that 
a market solution is difficult to achieve.72 
4.2.3. Potential costs of full mandatory insurance 
There are costs to be expected when ICS would be fully replaced by private insurances:  
 As already mentioned, the lack of insurers' experience regarding the investment 
industry implies that risk assessment may not improve.  
 Investment firms will also have to pay for the insurer’s profit margin (and 
insurance selling taxes) which increases administrative costs.  
 Insurers may be less concerned of destroying reputational capital of the 
investment industry or a certain group of investment firms or banks. Consequently, 
insurers are less likely to pay damages than ICS if there are investor compensation 
cases which are not clear from a legal point of view. This may become important in 
particular if the Directive remains silent on the burden of proof and if the Basic 
Model might be interpreted in a way which that requires investors to prove fraud, 
negligence or causation.  
                                          
69 European Commission (2010b), p. 80. Even though Article 4a of the ICSD proposal explicitly prescribes an ex 
ante target fund level, ex post funding might still be necessary. Insurers may also define target fund levels 
differently. 
70 ICCL (2009), p. 13, 24. 
71 Oxera (2005), p. 35. 
72 However, ICCL (2011) reports that it concluded a so called ‘Excess of Loss’ insurance contract for ICS damages 
exceeding EUR 15 million. Coverage is limited by a cap of EUR 50 million (for banks and investment firms), see 
ICCL (2011), p. 17, 22, 61. 
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 Insurers may fail as well. If a big insurer fails and no, or insufficient, re-insurance 
exists, the government might be forced to bail out. Even though the level of 
interconnectedness is smaller with insurance firms than with banks, an insurer’s 
failure may severely affect other financial institutions (one example is AIG in 2008). 
Larger portfolios improve risk diversification, but they also let insurers grow and 
may cause a bigger systemic risk. Pooling solutions (several insurers provide 
insurance together) might reduce the single risk borne by one insurer. However, it 
may restrict competition and systemic risks remain.  
 The evidence on other catastrophic risks suggests that the insurance market is likely 
to get disrupted after a major loss event. As a reaction, insurers raised prices, 
limited coverage, cancelled policies or even retreated from the market.73 So after a 
major loss event, it might be necessary to establish an ICS again.  
4.2.4. Consequences of limited insurance coverage per investment firm 
In order to achieve better risk diversification, insurers are likely to offer contracts only with 
limited coverage. We observe limited coverage in other insurance markets as well. For 
instance, the insurer may cover damages up to EUR 100,000 per investor, but only to a 
pre-specified upper limit per investment firm, e.g. EUR 50 million per firm. If the damage is 
EUR 250 million – as with the German Phoenix Kapitaldienst GmbH case74  in 2005 –, 
EUR 200 million would not be covered.  
Two questions arise. Should there still be an ICS in place in order to cover the losses 
exceeding EUR 50 million? Would it not be better to stick with the ICS system because 
there is no limit on coverage? 
We will discuss the first question in more detail in the context of partial insurance. There, 
we will argue that the co-existence of insurance firm and ICS may cause specific incentive 
problems and co-ordination problems.  
With regard to the second question, one has to keep in mind that ICS funds are limited as 
well. In fact, even with unlimited liability there will always be limited coverage because the 
ICS assets are limited. Currently, no ICS is able to fully cover investors’ losses if a large 
investment firm/bank fails. Ex post funding and a borrowing mechanism between ICS as 
proposed by European Commission75 may increase coverage for the first big firm(s) failing. 
However, this usually leaves less money for other (large) firms falling subsequently if this 
happens shortly after. Moreover, borrowing mechanisms may distort incentives of the 
national ICS.76 
                                          
73 Jaffee (2005). 
74 See Bigus and Leyens (2008), p. 63. 
75 European Commission (2010a), Article 4b. 
76 See Bigus and Leyens (2008), p. 85. 
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4.2.5. Insurance taken out by the investor compensation scheme 
The ICS may buy insurance cover for damages incurred by their investment firm members. 
In this case, the ICS is the insurance taker and the investment firm members (or 
respectively their clients) are the beneficiaries of such insurance. On the one hand, an 
apparent benefit to this solution is the savings in administrative costs, since there is only 
one contract with each ICS instead of many contracts with the investment firms.  
On the other hand, the insurer will nevertheless want to have a detailed risk analysis of the 
investment firms covered (see ICCL, 2009) which may even increase overall administrative 
costs. Moreover, the ICS may have fewer incentives to assess and to control the risks if 
there is full insurance cover. If insurance coverage is limited, the ICS's incentives may 
improve. However, as both, the ICS and the insurer, will assess and control the risk this 
may (possibly) result in double and inefficient work. Incentives for proper risk assessment 
and controlling may also be distorted since one party (e.g. the insurance undertaking) 
bears the costs of doing so, whereas the other party, e.g. the ICS, benefits from it as well. 
Consequently, the question arises why insurers should not directly insure the investment 
firms. ICS will only be needed if insurers do not provide unlimited coverage, if the problems 
of double risk evaluation and controlling, and if incentive and coordination problems 
between ICS and insurers are negligible. Otherwise, a full replacement of the ICS seems to 
be a better option. 
The ICCL (2011) reports that they bought a so-called ‘excess of loss’ insurance which 
covers damages exceeding EUR 15 million up to a limit of EUR 50 million for investment 
firms and banks. Such a scheme has some beneficial features. First, the ICS has strong 
incentives to effectively assess and control risks whereas the insurer does not need to 
perform a detailed risk analysis of each investment firm. Probably, the insurer will have a 
closer look at the proper functioning of the ICS's risk assessment and risk controlling and at 
the bigger investment firms in the pool. Risk allocation improves if the insurer has a larger 
pool of single risks which enables the insurance undertaking to insure large losses (better 
than the ICS). However, the insurance undertaking in the case of ICCL does not take over 
large risks exceeding damages of EUR 50 million. This ensures proper risk diversification; 
however, it also implies that investors’ damages from large investment firm failures have to 
be paid by the ICS or – more likely – by the taxpayer. Still, from an economics perspective, 
the ICCL model is certainly favourable to those ICS that currently have a small number of 
investment firms and/or which do not ask for risk-sensitive charges. 
4.2.6. Summary 
There are three options for investment firms buying insurance: (1) full and mandatory 
insurance, (2) partial and mandatory insurance, (3) partial and voluntary insurance. Full 
insurance covers all four event risks (fraud, administrative malpractice, operational error 
and bad advice), partial insurance only a subset of them. 
The probability and the size of damages to be covered depend on characteristics of the 
investment firm, such as whether the firm is authorised to hold client assets or trade 
securities for their own account, whether there is an efficient internal control system and 
how big the firm is. Most likely, banks engaging in investment activities have a different 
risk profile than investment firms. 
The question if full and mandatory insurance is economically desirable compared to 
the current partial insurance system, is evaluated as regards its effect on (1) incentives 
of investment firms, (2) risk assessment and risk controlling, (3) risk diversification and 
allocation, (4) administrative costs, (5) competition and (6) other costs and benefits such 
as reputation. The Table below provides an overview. 
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Table 8: Comparison of full and mandatory insurance versus no insurance 
Full and mandatory 
insurance for 
investment firms 
Possible benefits vs.  
no insurance  
(i.e. only ICS-membership) 
Possible costs vs. no insurance (i.e. 
only ICS-membership) 
Risk diversification …will improve only if insurers (or 
pools of insurers) have larger 
pools of investment firms with 
similar risks than ICS do (e.g. in 
Germany) 
…will improve if insurers choose 
investment firms of similar risk 
(size), e.g., big insurers pick big 
investment firms in Europe 
 
Risk assessment and 
risk controlling 
…will improve because insurers 
have strong incentives to require 
risk-sensitive insurance 
premiums (most ICS currently do 
not) 
…but insurers may have less 
(qualitative) expertise with the 
investment industry than ICS have 
…temporarily, lack of quantitative data 
for proper actuarial assessment 
Investment firms’ 
incentives 
…will improve because risk-
sensitive (and ex ante) charges 
make them internalise the 
consequences of risky behaviour 
 
Administrative costs  Insurers need to earn a profit margin 
(ICS not necessarily) 
…higher costs to investment firms due 
to regular provision of detailed risk-
relevant data 
Competition risk-sensitive charges will 
improve competition 
…however, fixed costs of risk 
assessment may drive small investment 
firms out of the market 
Other costs and 
benefits 
 …insurers may care less about 
reputational capital of the investment 
industry or a certain sub-group of it 
...insurers may fail as well, this may 
cause systemic risk (see chapter 6) 
If insurers are not willing to offer 
unlimited coverage per investment firm, 
ICS is still necessary. Further, additional 
problems may occur (double risk 
monitoring and assessment, frictions in 
damage compensation, free rider 
problems, see chapter 4.3) 
Source:  CEP/Bigus. 
Alternatively, the ICS itself may buy insurance cover for damages incurred by its 
investment firms. With unlimited coverage such a model does not make sense, since there 
is no benefit in having an ICS. 
As explained above, the Irish and the Canadian ICS recently bought ‘excess of loss’ 
insurance which only covers damages exceeding a specific amount (EUR 15 million in 
Ireland, CAD 116 million in Canada) up to another specific threshold (EUR 50 million in 
Ireland). Risk allocation improves if the insurer is able to diversify better larger risks. 
However, very large risks still stay with the ICS. The insurer’s costs of risk assessment and 
risk monitoring (which are actually borne by the investment firms) are lower than with full 
PE 492.451 42 
Alternatives to Investor Compensation Schemes and their Impact 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
insurance since the insurer is primarily interested in information on large and/or relatively 
risky investment firms and the ICS has incentives to properly monitor risks. Since 
insurance charges will depend on ICS monitoring abilities, the ICS is likely to have better 
incentives, too. Still, insurance premiums are quite high. 
4.3. Market and financial issues 
4.3.1. Probability and attractiveness of full private insurance by investment 
firms 
Currently, no investment firm has a private insurance policy in place offering coverage for 
all four events of the Basic Model. Feedback from an extensive questioning of both 
insurance associations and insurance undertakings across all Member States is very clear: 
there is very little or no willingness in the insurance industry to offer insurance to 
investment firms covering the four events of the Basic Model. 
The main reasons for this reluctance are the following: 
i) A perceived inability by insurance undertakings to assess risks at the investment 
firm. Insufficient available data and the lack of experience with these kinds of risk 
aggravate the problem.  
ii) Additionally, a number of respondents point to a lack of re-insurance for such 
insurance policies. 
iii) A number of respondents from smaller Member States argue that the domestic 
market would be too small for such an insurance. The relatively small number of 
investment firms makes the required risk diversification at every insurance 
undertaking offering such insurance impossible. 
iv) Two respondents see a moral hazard problem for financial supervisors. They claim 
that the mere existence of full private insurance would cause supervisors to close 
down ailing investment firms more easily than without such insurance. This would 
make it more difficult for insurance undertakings to adequately estimate default risks. 
v) A number of respondents refer to a lack of own funds on the side of insurance 
undertakings to offer such insurance. 
If at all, taking out private insurance seems feasible only if the risk to insurance 
undertakings is limited by capping the insured amount. However, even when capping the 
insured damage at EUR 5 Million per investment firm per year, only three respondents have 
signalled a (low) willingness to offer insurance.77 
Conclusion 1: For a variety of reasons, the willingness of insurance undertakings 
to offer full private insurance to investment firms covering all four events of the 
Basic Model is close to zero. Allowing for liability caps only slightly increases the 
likelihood of supply of such insurances and comes at the cost of cover falling 
significantly below the ICSD’s standards. 
From the point of view of investment firms, private insurance will be attractive only when 
costs for such insurance will be lower than regular contributions to the ICS. As only a 
minimal share of insurance undertakings responding to our questionnaire did not rule out 
                                          
77  This cap would not meet the assumptions of the Basic Model. In the past, an average compensation case dealt 
with by an ICS had about 430 investors claiming compensation. A cap of EUR 5 million per investment firm 
amounts to an average insurance cover of only EUR 11,625 per investor while the Basic Model envisages a 
cover of EUR 100,000 per investor. 
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offering full insurance, the number of responses on the potential costs of such insurance is 
equally limited and by no means sufficient to be statistically significant.  
We conclude that full private insurance without a liability cap is most likely to be 
prohibitively expensive. A very small number of insurance undertakings have signalled 
prices which on average would be around EUR 120,000 p.a. per investment firm if a liability 
cap of EUR 5 Million is applied. 
As shown below, the average annual contribution of investment firms to ICS - where data 
are available - is (in most cases and significantly) lower. Hence, on average there is no 
monetary incentive for investment firms to replace ICS membership by private insurance.  
Table 9: Average annual contribution by investment firms to selected ICS 
ICS Average annual contribution per member in EUR 
Austria (AeW) 3,000 
Bulgaria 6,500 
Czech Republic 110,000 
Finland 1,621 





Anonymous 1 36,000 
Source:  CEP/Bigus. 
It should be stressed however, that comparing the cost of insurance with ICS contributions 
of investment firms causes a number of methodological problems. These problems 
substantially diminish the explanatory value of this comparison. 
i) We list and include only ICS applying a considerable degree of ex ante financing. 
Many ICS finance their compensation costs on an ex post basis. Although the annual 
contribution to these latter ICS may often be close to zero, contributions may rise 
steeply once a compensation case occurs.  
ii) Whereas private insurance undertakings have an own interest in calculating insurance 
premiums in a way to cover expected losses (and make an additional profit), this is 
not necessarily the case for ICS. Hence, there is a risk that the average annual 
contributions, also of ex ante financing ICS, are simply too low. 
Conclusion 2: Scarce data suggests that for investment firms, private insurance 
contracts with a liability cap of EUR 5 million covering all four events of the Basic 
Model on average come at a significantly higher cost than ICS membership. 
However, given a number of methodological problems, this fact does not allow us 
to draw any conclusions on the efficiency of neither private insurances nor ICS. 
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4.3.2. Probability and attractiveness of full private insurance by ICS 
Not only investment firms might consider taking out private insurance, also ICS might do 
so. However, also for this case, feedback by the insurance industry to our questionnaires 
suggest there is very little or no willingness in the insurance industry to offer insurance to 
ICS covering the four events of the Basic Model. The main hurdles seem to be the national 
specificities every ICS is subject to and the lack of sufficient data on loss history in order to 
perform a proper risk assessment. 
Questioning the insurance industry specifically on the willingness to offer an ‘excess of loss’ 
insurance (with a liability floor of EUR 10 Million and a liability cap of EUR 50 Million) does 
not significantly change this picture. Price quotes for such insurance were too rare and 
diverse to give a serious picture of potential costs. We know however, that the Irish ICS 
currently pays around EUR 300,000 on a yearly basis for its ‘excess of loss’ insurance. 
Interestingly, in their feedback to our questionnaire, ICS in general were not of the opinion 
that the purchase of such ‘excess of loss’ insurance would significantly lower ICS 
contributions (excluding costs for the insurance). 
There are some remarks to be made in this respect. 
i) The structure of the insurance market might well have a decisive influence on the 
cost of ‘excess of loss’ insurance. The Irish ICS has purchased its insurance over 
Lloyd’s of London which, given its market structure, might be especially well suited to 
take on large risks concentrated at a single insurance taker. 
ii) Different liability floors and caps of the ‘excess of loss’ insurance might have different 
effects on ICS contributions. We only investigated one variant. 
iii) The absence of falling ICS contributions does not allow for conclusions on the 
economic usefulness of ‘excess of loss’ contributions. Such conclusions presuppose 
that the ICS would have excess financial means in relation to the new relevant 
compensation level (in essence: the liability floor of the ‘excess of loss’ insurance). 
Conclusion 3: There is insufficient empirical data to conclude whether taking out 
‘excess of loss’ insurance is economically attractive to ICS.  
4.4. Legal issues 
In this chapter, we focus on a number of legal problems which may arise from a full and 
mandatory replacement of ICS-membership by private insurance contracts to be taken out 
by investment firms. 
4.4.1. Mandatory insurance 
With respect to insurance bought by investment firms on a mandatory basis, the 
mandatory character of such insurance contract might prove problematic. How such 
obligation would be designed is unclear today. We consider the following two possibilities: 
i) An investment firm must take out private insurance covering the Basic Model in order 
to be allowed to offer its services (i.e. to obtain authorisation) or 
ii) insurance undertakings must cover such insurance to any investment firm wishing to 
buy it. 
On Question (i), it should be said that similar obligations already exist in a number of 
fields. As an example, Article 3 of the Directive 2009/103/EC relating to insurance against 
civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles and the enforcement of the obligation to 
insure against such liability requires Member States ‘to ensure that civil liability in respect 
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of the use of vehicles normally based in its territory is covered by insurance’. In general, 
this comes down to an obligation on the part of each car driver to ensure that valid motor 
liability insurance exists for the vehicle used. 
Another example for mandatory insurances is the professional indemnity insurance for 
alternative investment fund managers.78 In the case of insurance mediation79 and credit 
agreements relating to residential property, 80  intermediaries can choose between 
professional indemnity insurance and a comparable guarantee against liability arising from 
professional negligence. Similar prescriptions also apply to certain investment firms.81 
Furthermore, other Directives enable Member States to force ‘providers whose services 
present a direct and particular risk to the health or safety of the recipient or a third person 
or to the financial security of the recipient’ as well as lawyers working in a Member State 
(other than that in which they obtained the qualification) to take out professional indemnity 
insurance.82 A number of similar prescriptions exist in national laws. 
On question (ii), in the field of motor insurance, some Member States however have gone 
further and have introduced obligations on the part of the insurance undertakings as well. 
As an example, according to the German Mandatory Vehicle Insurance Law, a private 
insurer who offers such insurance is legally obliged to enter into a contract with any owner 
of a vehicle.83 The same holds true for Hungary. 
Feedback from both the insurance industry (including associations) and insurance 
supervisors is very critical on imposing a legal obligation on insurance undertakings to offer 
a certain insurance product on a mandatory basis. With the exception of referrals to the 
freedom of contract, arguments brought forward are of an economic, not a legal nature. It 
is often argued, that forcing insurance undertakings to take on a certain risk stands in 
conflict with a free market and that insurance undertakings might not have the necessary 
capital to underlay risks.  
We conclude that both, a mandatory insurance taking as well as mandatory insurance 
offering, restrict the freedom of contract protected by the freedom to conduct a business 
according to Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.84  
Although this does not make it legally impossible to introduce such obligations, it would 
require convincing arguments justifying the restricting of these fundamental rights. The 
point for mandatory insurance taking in the case of civil motor liability insurance can be 
made convincingly by referring to car accidents causing damage to third parties to an 
amount which cannot be covered by the average driver. Therefore, mandatory insurance 
taking by investment firms seems justifiable as well. In essence, already today, mandatory 
ICS membership for investment firms is nothing else than a form of mandatory insurance 
taking. However, we do not see a convincing argument for obliging insurance undertakings 
to offer insurance to investment firms. 
                                          
78 Article 9 (7) lit. b of the Directive 2011/61/EU on Alternative Investment Fund Managers. 
79 Article 4 (3) of the Directive 2002/92/EC on insurance mediation. 
80 Article 21 (1) lit. b of the Proposal COM(2011) 142 for a Directive on credit agreements relating to residential 
property. 
81 Article 7 (1) of the Directive 2006/49/EC on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions 
(recast). 
82 Article 23 (1) of the Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal market and Article 6 (3) of the Directive 
1998/5/EC, to facilitate practice of the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other 
than that in which the qualification was obtained. 
83 § 5 (2) German Mandatory Vehicle Insurance Law (Gesetz über die Pflichtversicherung für Fahrzeughalter). 
84 European Court of Justice, Joined Cases C-90/90 and 91/90, Jean Neu and Others, paragraph 13; European 
Court of Justice, Case C-240/97, Kingdom of Spain, paragraph 99. 
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With respect to insurance bought by ICS, the first question arising in this context is 
whether the ICS is financed ex ante or ex post.85 Austria (with the exception of AeW, see 
above), Germany (with the exception of EdW, see above), Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
Sweden, Slovenia, UK, Portugal have such ex post financed ICS.86 For these systems, it 
might be difficult to take out insurance, as these are to be paid ex ante. However, ex post 
ICS do not receive regular contributions by the investment firms which could be used to 
pay insurance premiums. Some exceptions are noteworthy. For example in Italy, the ex 
post ICS is allowed by law to buy insurance and to collect such cost among its members.87 
In contrast, ex ante financed systems may have the means to buy insurance and pay 
premiums. However, the possibility to take out insurance is not explicitly foreseen in most 
of the Member States with ex ante systems. Hence, some ex ante financed ICS claim they 
would therefore have to consult first with their supervisors. 
The Commission proposal COM(2010)371 clarifies in its Article 4a that all EU ICS should 
have an ex ante funded target level fund supplemented by ex post contributions if 
necessary. The EP's resolution lowers the target level but does not alter this general set-up. 
4.4.2. General compatibility with Solvency II 
Full private insurance may be taken out on the level of investment firms as well as on the 
level of the ICS. Although capital requirements on the side of insurance undertakings might 
be very high when insurance contracts are mandatory, and/or no liability cap and re-
insurance would be available, we see no insurmountable legal or methodological obstacles 
raised by the Solvency II Framework to provide this insurance cover.  
This conclusion is supported by the replies we received to our questionnaire. Only few 
respondents identify obstacles. One respondent sees difficulties in distinguishing between 
insured and uninsured events in fraud cases, some other point to the need of high capital 
requirements as a precautionary measure due to a lack in historic data on the occurrence 
and costs of liability events and when issuing mandatory insurances. Additionally, a 
classification of investment firm’s business is needed to determine which capital 
requirements apply. EIOPA states that it might be necessary to re-calibrate some capital 
requirements with the Solvency II framework, but believes this is not a major problem. 
4.4.3. State-run insurance undertaking 
At least in some Member States (Italy and Poland), the establishment of an insurance 
undertaking governed by public law is not possible. Article 17 (1) of Directive 2009/138/EC 
(Solvency II) states that insurance undertakings must adopt one of the legal forms set out 
in Annex III of this directive. Insurance undertakings governed by public law are for most 
of the Member States not part of the Annex. However, according to Article 17 (2) of the 
Solvency II Directive, Member States may set up insurance undertakings governed by 
public law if these undertakings operate under the same conditions as undertakings 
governed by private law. The Italian Insurance Code and the Polish Insurance Activity Act 
for example do not provide for this option.88 Hence, insurance undertakings governed by 
public law in these countries are prohibited. This prohibition does not prevent the State to 
own an insurance undertaking governed by private law. 
                                          
85 The distinction between ex ante and ex post ICS is not always easy to make. Some ICS show in fact elements 
of both, for example by ex ante financing of a relatively small amount of funds which is supplemented by ex 
post payments in case of a compensation case. Also ICS which are financed ex ante might be required to 
resort to additional ex post contributions in case of a large payout case. 
86 SEC(2010) 845, p. 95 et seq. 
87 Article 17 of the Italian Bylaws to Article 15 of Law no. 1 of 2 January 1991. 
88 Article 14 (1) lit. a of the Italian Insurance Code, Article 5 of the Polish Insurance Activity Act. 
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Given certain preconditions being met, insurance supervisory bodies responding to the 
questionnaire in general see no legal obstacles to a state-run insurance undertaking 
offering a mandatory insurance. The insurance would have to comply completely with 
Solvency II rules. Yet, several supervisors argue that the creation of such a state insurance 
is rather unlikely given the current economic situation in Europe and a general priority of 
private instead of public economic activity. Furthermore, it has been questioned whether 
such a framework would be advantageous in comparison with the current ICS framework.  
4.4.4. Winding down ICS 
Full replacement of ICS by private insurance contracts would make ICS superfluous. The 
winding down of ICS could however pose some legal problems.  
First, some ICS have taken out loans in order to finance compensation payments. When 
winding down such ICS, a way must be found for ICS members to repay the loan. 
Therefore, the dissolution of ICS cannot be pursued in an ad hoc manner. 
Secondly, there would be a need for specific rules dealing with the question of what will 
happen to contributions which have been paid by investment firms to ex ante funded ICS. 
These funds must be dissolved and repaid to members. The difficulty behind these 
repayments is the determination of the exact amount each investment firm should receive, 
due to, for instance, different membership periods or open liability event proceedings.  
Another obstacle for the dissolution of ICS is the question on how to deal with ongoing 
liability cases. As these cases usually take several years until they are closed, a transitional 
period for the system shift is inevitable.  
4.4.5. Guaranteeing insurance coverage 
In order to guarantee that private insurance contracts taken out by investment firms do in 
effect cover damages which materialise, it will be essential that insurance premiums are 
always paid in time. Otherwise, the insurance undertaking might be released from its 
contractual obligations to cover damage. Hence, it is clear already today, that in a context 
of mandatory private insurance to be taken out by investment firms, the timely and regular 
payment of insurance premiums must be closely monitored.89 
Regarding the question who should carry out the task of controlling whether an investment 
firm has de facto taken out appropriate insurance cover (irrespective of what type of partial 
or full insurance solution has been agreed on) and has paid for it in time, most responding 
ICS denied a controlling role for ICS. Some stated that ICS are not capable of doing this 
job as expertise about the insurance business is rather limited; others doubt the standing 
of ICS. In addition, building up administration to deal with such a task might be expensive. 
In Germany, insurance undertakings play a key role. The German Regulation on 
Contributions to be paid to the EdW (EdWBeitrV) sets out the conditions under which a 
crime cover insurance taken out by an investment firm may lead to a reduction of ICS 
contributions. Insurance undertakings must confirm the existence of the insurance contract 
                                          
89 In Germany for instance, the insurer does not have to provide coverage if the policyholder does not pay the 
single payment or the first premium before an insured event occurs. This does not apply if the policyholder can 
prove that the non-payment is not his fault (Article 37 of the German Insurance Contract Code). If the 
policyholder does not pay a premium during an ongoing contract (following premium) in time, the insurer can 
set a payment deadline of at least two weeks. In case an insured event occurs after this deadline and before 
the premium is paid, the insurer does not have to provide coverage (Article 38 of the German Insurance 
Contract Code). In Italy, the insurance cover is suspended until the premium is paid, if the policyholder does 
not pay the single payment or the first premium in time. If he does not pay a following premium, the insurance 
cover is suspended after two weeks. After six months of non-payment, the contract is cancelled (Article 1901 
of the Italian Civil Code). 
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as well as that it fulfils the conditions set out in the EdWBeitrV for an investment firm to be 
able to demand a reduction in the contribution. 
Many respondents claim that national supervisory authorities, courts or auditors could be 
the entities responsible for performing this task. Some respondents point out that, 
irrespective of who carries out the ‘insurance check’, there should be general rules on 
insurance contract arrangements. In case these rules are rather detailed, the submission of 
a certificate might be sufficient, in case these rules are unspecific, insurance contracts 
should be looked at in depth. 
If supervisory bodies are to be the relevant entities to ensure that all investment firms 
have insurance coverage at all times for those risks not covered by ICS any longer, several 
aspects have to be looked at. First, in case the supervisory body for insurance undertakings 
is not the same as the one for investment firms, it has to be determined who should be 
responsible for carrying out the insurance check, respectively which of the bodies is capable 
in doing so. This is important as the conclusion of an insurance contract could be a 
precondition for obtaining an investment firm licence. Second, either investment firms or 
their insurers should be obliged to submit documents to the supervisory body on a regular 
basis proving the existence of appropriate insurance coverage. 
Two respondents stress the need for some kind of ‘rescue package’ in order to deal with the 
situation where an insurance undertaking goes into bankruptcy. This would cause the 
insured investment firm to lose its insurances coverage, and potentially its licence as an 
investment firm.  
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5. PARTIAL REPLACEMENT OF ICS BY PRIVATE 
INSURANCE CONTRACTS 
KEY FINDINGS 
 A partial replacement of investor compensation schemes (ICS) implies that an 
insurer covers damages from some of the four risks mentioned above (fraud, 
administrative malpractice, bad advice, operational errors) while the ICS covers the 
remaining risks. 
 Partial insurance causes the following problems: (1) Double work with regard to risk 
assessment and risk controlling. (2) Lower quality in risk controlling because ICS 
and insurer may free ride on each other’s efforts. (3) Frictions in the damage 
compensation process, e.g. if the cause of damage and hence, the responsibility, is 
not entirely clear.  
 If these problems cannot be solved, full replacement of ICS is preferable to partial 
replacement, independent of whether partial insurance is voluntary or mandatory.  
 A number of private insurance contracts are available on the market today covering 
elements similar to those of the Basic Model. Nevertheless, the insurance industry 
on average gives the impression to be very unwilling to offer such insurances in an 
ICS context. In our interpretation, neither insurance undertakings nor ICS have a 
particular interest in partially replacing ICS by private insurances. 
 We see major legal problems when partially replacing ICS by private insurance 
contracts. The main problem relates to the design of the EP’s Basic Model. We 
expect costly and lengthy legal disputes in order to clarify what exactly (fraud, 
malpractice, etc.) has caused a compensation claim to occur. Against this 
background, dividing responsibility between insurance undertakings and ICS is not 
advisable. 
5.1. Introduction 
5.1.1. Which risks are supposed to be partially insured? 
With partial insurance, the insurer only covers damages from some of the four event risks 
mentioned above, while the ICS is still in place and covers the remaining damages. 
Different to the full insurance scenario, the ICS is certainly still needed. Insurers are likely 
to efficiently price those risks on which they have experience and sufficient data. Pecuniary 
loss liability insurance and crime insurance already exist.90 
Expertise of and efficient pricing by insurance undertakings are relevant, but potential 
frictions in the damage compensation process are important as well. Generally speaking, 
only risks that are – from a legal point of view – clearly separable from others are suitable 
for private insurance. Whether this is the case also depends on the national legal rules. 
However, it is out of the scope of this study to perform a profound legal analysis on this 
issue covering all 27 Member States of the European Union. 
                                          
90 See Chapter 3.1. 
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One risk that might be fairly separable from other risks is fraud since it requires intentional 
behaviour of the investment firm or its employees. Damages from malpractice, operational 
errors or bad advice are more likely to be based on (gross) negligence. Even though the 
Basic Model suggested by the European Parliament does not link damage compensation to 
the violation of a standard of due care which defines negligent behaviour it might well play 
a role when courts have to decide on whether malpractice, bad advice or fraud actually is 
on hand. 
Thus, we think that partial insurance may either cover damages from intentional behaviour 
(fraud) or other damages resulting from malpractice, operational errors or bad advice. The 
ICS will have to cover the remaining risks. 
Still, frictions might occur, for instance, if an employee of an investment firm acted 
intentionally. The insurer and the ICS might argue whether the behaviour is more in line 
with fraud or malpractice/bad advice. We think, however, that frictions are less likely to 
occur than with other allocations of risks among insurers and ICS. Still, the European 
legislators may want to clearly determine responsibilities in order to avoid delayed damage 
compensation.  
5.1.2. Many insurers or one insurer per investment firm? 
There might be a scenario where insurance firm A covers fraud risk, insurer B covers the 
risk of administrative malpractice and insurer C the risk of bad advice. The benefit would be 
that the total risk is borne by many insurers such that risk-sharing might be improved. 
Additionally, it is more likely that different insurers have specific knowledge which might 
improve risk assessment and risk controlling and makes efficient pricing more likely.  
However, there are three important reasons why it seems to be more efficient if one 
insurer covers all the risks. First, with many insurers each of them would have to assess 
and control risk so there is double or even triple work which would increase overall 
administrative costs. Second, there might be a ‘free rider problem’ because insurer A bears 
the costs of proper risk controlling alone but the other insurers B and C benefit from proper 
risk controlling even when the risks covered are different. Since A fully bears the costs but 
shares the benefits with B and C, A has weaker incentives for proper risk controlling. Of 
course, the same reasoning applies to insurers B and C. Overall; insurers have weaker 
incentives to control their risk which might actually systematically increase the investment 
firm’s risk. Hence, this is also an issue of systemic risk.  
The third argument might be the most important one even though we already mentioned it 
above. In case of damage, insurers A, B and C might argue whether the damage was 
caused by fraud, administrative malpractice or bad advice since these facts might 
sometimes be difficult to distinguish. The administrative costs are likely to increase with the 
number of insurers as is always the case when responsibilities are not or cannot be clearly 
defined. Probably, the investors will have to wait longer for damage compensation with a 
larger number of insurers. The probability of damage compensation may also decrease 
since courts will find it harder to unambiguously assign the damage to a specific insurance.  
To sum up, it makes economic sense that the various risks of one investment firm should 
be covered by one insurer only. We will assume only one insurer per firm in the following 
analysis. We also strongly suggest supplementing the Basic Model by such a requirement.  
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5.2. Economic Issues 
5.2.1. Voluntary partial insurance 
With partial insurance, the insurer bears only some of the four risks (e.g. fraud) and the 
ICS the remaining risks. Additionally, the ICS bears all risks of those investment firms that 
do not voluntarily buy insurance. Apparently, both the insurers and the ICS will have to 
deal with each investment firms which implies double effort and some specific problems. 
Investment firms will only voluntarily buy private insurance if it pays off, e.g., if there is a 
sufficient reduction in ICS charges which exceeds the insurance premium. In Germany, 
investment firms pay 15% less ICS charge with a crime cover insurance if certain 
conditions are met (e.g., a deductible).91 In order to keep the economic analysis simple, let 
us assume that the investment firm buys fraud insurance and the ICS bears the other risks 
from malpractice, operational errors and bad advice.92 
Risk allocation. Risk-sharing will be improved because ICS and insurers bear different 
types of risks. There might be risk-shifting, though. If ICS charges are computed by size or 
earnings attributes, such as gross revenues, but not by the investment firm’s actual risk, 
large and especially profitable investment firms will perceive the ICS fees to be too high if 
their actual fraud risk is low. Also investment firms with a well functioning internal control 
system will buy fraud insurance. The premium for the insurance is supposedly relatively 
small compared to the savings in ICS charges. Consequently, generally low risk investment 
firms will buy voluntary fraud insurance but ‘bad risks’ will stick with the ICS.93 This will 
increase the default probability in the ICS system and eventually will increase ICS fees for 
the remaining investment firms. 
Risk assessment and risk controlling. If risk covered by the insurer and by the ICS are 
separable, risk evaluation and risk controlling will be rather different, either. The insurer is 
concerned about fraud risk, the ICS about the other risks. To some extent, there still might 
be double work also because some risks might be highly correlated such as fraud and bad 
advice. Both insurer and ICS may check the efficiency of the internal control system, 
executive compensation and trading limits since they affect both fraud risk but also the 
other risks. However, there also might be less incentive to properly asses and control the 
risk due to the free-rider problem mentioned above: insurer and ICS may rely on each 
other proper risk controlling such that both of them have distorted incentives to do a good 
job. This can cause a systemic risk. Even though incentives of both, the insurer and the 
ICS, get distorted, there might also be benefits: specialised fraud insurers might be better 
qualified to evaluate and control risk (even though they still may lack historical damage 
data and expertise on the investment industry). If the free rider problem is more severe 
than the potential specialisation effect, investment firms’ incentives will get distorted as 
well, because then risk controlling will not work properly. 
Risk diversification. Both, risk-shifting and weaker incentives to control risk, will impair 
risk diversification because correlation of (bad) risks will increase. The effect might be 
mitigated by specialisation effects, though. 
                                          
91 See chapter 3.3.2. 
92 Of course, other allocations of the four risks are imaginable. However, they may imply that problems of double 
work, free riding and frictions in damage compensation become worse as suggested by the analysis in chapter 
5.1.1. 
93 We expect an opposite effect if insurance firms offer the same contracts (charges) for high-risk and low-risk 
investment firms. In this case, insurance firms are likely to attract the high risks. The low risks might rather 
stay with the ICS. We assume insurance firms to be knowledgeable and to offer specialised contracts adjusted 
to the investment firm’s risk. 
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Administrative costs might be higher for three reasons. First, at least to some extent 
there will be double work by private insurer and ICS. Second, it might be the case that 
insurer and ICS argue once damage materialises whether damage is related to fraud or 
other facts – at the expense of investors. If the legislator manages to separate these risks 
well, administrative costs will not increase too much. Third, insurers will ask for a profit 
margin, whereas ICS usually do not.  
As with full insurance, insurers will be less concerned about reputation effects. An ICS 
might be more willing than an insurer to pay damage compensation in cases which are not 
clear form a legal point of view.  
If the benefits of voluntary insurance outweigh its costs, we should observe that 
investment firms already have bought it. But this can be said of crime cover insurance only. 
5.2.2. Mandatory partial insurance compared to voluntary partial insurance 
With mandatory partial insurance the insurers bears only some of the four risks, e.g., fraud 
risk, of all investment firms and the ICS bears all the remaining risks. We now stress the 
differences compared to voluntary partial insurance.  
With mandatory insurance, risk allocation is improved because there will be no risk 
shifting. Due to the obligation to buy insurance, the proportion of low-risk and high-risk 
investment firms in the ICS will not be affected. Still, there is a positive effect of risk 
sharing between insurance firms and ICS. This is especially useful for ICS which have only 
a small number of investment firms (below 30 ‐ 50 investment firms). 
Mandatory insurance will also improve risk diversification. Since it increases demand for 
insurance, insurers will write more contracts so risk can be diversified better.  
The reasoning with regard to risk assessment and risk controlling remains unchanged 
to the voluntary partial insurance. Still, free rider problems may occur. 
Administrative costs are supposedly higher than with voluntary insurance. If the 
insurance market is sufficiently concentrated, profit margins may increase with mandatory 
insurance. The main reason for higher costs are the fixed costs of insurer’s risk assessment 
and risk controlling which all investment firms have to bear in a mandatory regime. 
Especially small investment firms might suffer from that – larger investment firms will 
benefit if smaller firms have to drop out of the market. Drop-outs will reduce competition 
between investment firms, especially in those countries where there is only a limited 
number of investment firms. 
Administrative costs might also be higher than in the voluntary partial insurance scenario 
since it is more likely that insurer and ICS have to disentangle mixed cases, for instance, 
cases where it is not clear, whether damages are related to fraud risk (which is supposedly 
covered by the insurer) or related to bad advice (covered by the ICS). 
Another problem occurs if insurers are only willing to offer limited coverage per 
investment firm even though they only take over some risks, e.g. only fraud risk. With 
large failures, the ICS might still have to bear the uncovered damages.  
There are also two benefits. Changes in insurance premiums are useful information to 
supervisors especially when there is information on each investment firm, including high-
risk firms. With voluntary insurance, high-risk investment firms are not likely to buy 
insurance. The second benefit is that investors’ trust in the investor protection system is 
enhanced if they know for sure that each investment firm is obliged to have private 
insurance as well. This will benefit the whole industry. 
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5.2.3. Mandatory partial insurance compared to mandatory full insurance 
In the full insurance scenario, the private insurers cover all damages related to the four 
risks mentioned above. Ideally, the ICS does not exist anymore. If an investment firm fails, 
there is only coverage by the insurer. One benefit of full replacement of ICS is that double 
risk evaluation/risk controlling and possible free rider problems will not occur – at least not 
with investment firms. 94  Hence, some incentive problems will be mitigated and 
administrative costs will probably be lower as well. With banks providing investment 
services, double work will still be done to some extent. 
There might also be costs attached to the full replacement of ICS. First, it is not entirely 
clear that insurers have the knowledge to do better risk assessment and risk controlling 
than ICS do, because they are assumed to have less knowledge on the investment 
industry. The ICCL (2009) mentions this problem. However, insurers may learn over time, 
especially in a competitive environment. Second, insurers will ask for a profit margin 
whereas ICS usually do not. With full replacement, the profit margin will be bigger in 
absolute terms than with partial replacement. Third, in a full insurance scenario, there is no 
ICS anymore which cares about reputation concerns of the industry or the relevant group 
of investment firms. 
5.2.4. Partial insurance concluded by the ICS 
The main arguments also apply where the ICS takes out partial insurance for all its 
members, as is the case with AeW in Austria which has taken out insurance covering fraud 
at its members. With partial insurance, there is still double work by ICS and insurers, free 
rider problems are likely to occur, incentives by investment firms might get distorted and 
there might still be conflicts between ICS and insurer in mixed cases. The benefit that 
insurers are specialised on the specific risk covered seems to be rather negligible. From our 
point of view, if insurance is taken out by the ICS, full insurance is preferable to partial 
insurance. 
5.2.5. Summary 
In contrast to full insurance (with replacement of the ICS), partial insurance causes some 
additional problems due to the co-existence of the insurers and the ICS. First, at least to 
some extent, there will be double work performed by both insurers and ICS with regard to 
risk assessment and risk controlling. Second, ICS and insurer may also free ride on each 
other’s efforts in controlling risks. Third, there might be frictions in the damage 
compensation process when responsibilities of insurer and ICS are not clearly defined. In 
principle, those problems exist with both the mandatory and the voluntary design of partial 
insurance. 
One way out would be that ICS buy insurance for some risks which covers losses exceeding 
a certain amount. As argued above, problems of double work and free riding are then 
limited. Such a model would be similar to the ICCL approach except that the ICCL bought 
an insurance which includes all four risks mentioned above. If ICS buy only partial 
insurance coverage there might still be arguing on those damages that cannot be clearly 
assigned to fraud, bad advice etc. and thus, not clearly assigned to insurer or ICS. 
Consequently, if insurance is taken out by the ICS according to the ICCL approach, full 
insurance is preferable to partial insurance. 
                                          
94 If a bank with investment services fails, the insurer would cover the investor’s damages and the deposit 
guarantee scheme (DGS) is supposed to pay for the depositors’ damages. 
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5.3. Market and financial issues 
In this section, we discuss the probability and attractiveness of partial private insurance by 
investment firms. Insurance undertakings’ willingness to offer partial insurance to 
investment firms has been tested by means of extensive questionnaires sent to the 
insurance industry. 
Although a number of insurance products covering fraudulent behaviour currently exist on 
the market, the willingness of insurances to offer partial insurance in an ICS context is very 
small. 95  This holds true for all variants of partial insurance. We see a very limited 
willingness to cover fraud (be it voluntarily or mandatory) or to cover malpractice, 
operational error and bad advice in an ICS context. This limited willingness – and hence 
also limited price quotes – make it impossible for us to compare costs and benefits of 
partial insurance. 
Moreover, answers by ICS on the implications of such insurances for ICS-contributions 
charged are very heterogeneous. Whereas a number of ICS argue that private fraud 
insurance might well reduce ICS' contributions, a significant number of ICS see no 
consequences at all for contributions. The picture gets even more heterogeneous with 
regard to private insurance for malpractice, operation error or bad advice.  
Conclusion: There exist a number of private insurance contracts on the market 
today covering elements similar to those of the Basic Model. Nevertheless, the 
insurance industry on average gives the impression to be very unwilling to offer 
such insurances in an ICS-context. In our interpretation, neither insurances nor 
ICS have a particular interest in partially replacing ICS by private insurances. 
5.4. Legal issues 
Many of the legal issues raised by partial substitution of ICS membership with private 
insurance taken out by investment firms were already dealt with in chapter 4.4. In this part 
of the study, we focus on some additional issues. 
5.4.1. Division of responsibility between insurance undertaking and ICS 
Partial private insurance will lead to the co-existence of private insurance and ICS-
membership. As a general feedback to our questionnaires, the vast majority of respondents 
expect it to be extremely difficult to determine which element exactly (fraud, operational 
error, administrative malpractice or bad advice) has given rise to a compensation case. In 
fact, all responding ICS expect difficulties in this matter and almost all respondents from 
the insurance industry see a ‘some’ or a ‘high’ correlation between fraud and the other 
three elements of the Basic Model.  
This is important, as distinguishing between these events might mean deciding on the 
question whether the ICS or the insurance undertaking has to compensate damages. 
Uncertainty in this regard may lead to delayed compensation payouts and an increase in 
litigation processes. Some respondents therefore pointed out that the terms and conditions 
of private insurance contracts should be regulated in a harmonised form (‘standard policy 
terms’) in order to ensure their overall consistency. Only when these terms are set in a 
uniform way, one can avoid payout problems. 
In the context of partial private insurance, the division of responsibility between insurance 
and ICS becomes even more complex, when two or more events (e.g. fraud and 
operational error) together are the reason for a failure, and these events are covered by 
                                          
95 For example, at least five different insurance undertakings have offered German investment firms crime cover 
insurance which was recognised by EDW to reduce the ICS contributions. 
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different entities (insurance and ICS). As some respondents argue, in such cases, it must 
be clarified which event has caused the failure to occur to which extent. Accordingly, the 
insurance and ICS would compensate proportionally. If this is not possible, compensation 
might be very difficult. In any case, legal conflicts and a considerable delay in 
compensation seem unavoidable. 
5.4.2. Exact coverage of private insurance 
Some respondents to our questionnaires expect difficulties for investment firms to correctly 
assess the exact coverage of different private insurance contracts, given the lack of 
experience by investment firms in these matters. As a consequence, some argue here in 
favour of standard policy terms set at the EU level, too.  
5.4.3. Level of ICS contribution 
A small number of respondents expect legal difficulties when ICS have to set different 
levels of contributions: one for those members being a full ICS member and one for those 
members which have a partial private insurance and remain ICS member for a subset of 
remaining events only. The respondents claim that ICS have insufficient available data on 
the probability of the occurrence of the remaining single events. Hence, ICS contributions 
would be legally contestable. 
5.4.4. Litigation risks 
A considerable number of respondent raise the litigation issue already dealt with in chapter 
2.1.2. Several ICS point out that the current ICSD is quite clear on when compensation is 
to be paid, whereas in an insurance world this might be largely dependent on the specific 
insurance contract concluded by the investment firm. This poses litigation risk as contracts 
can be interpreted differently. 
We would like to stress that this risk is not related to the private insurance, but rather to 
the set-up of the Basic Model itself. In other words: also when fully abstaining from private 
insurance contracts, an ICS subject to the Basic Model would be confronted with these 
problems. 
5.4.5. Data protection 
In reply to our questionnaires, neither investment firms nor insurance undertakings and 
their respective associations mention concerns about data protection. From a practical point 
of view, introducing insurance in an ICS context does not seem to create additional issues. 
Whereas today, upon the occurrence of a compensation case, personal data on investors is 
transferred to ICS, this information would be transferred to insurance undertakings in the 
future.  
Article 9 (1) ICSD states that ICS must take appropriate measures to inform investors 
about an indemnification case. In order to be able to deliver this information, it seems to be 
common practice today that investment firms pass the necessary data to the ICS 
concerned. Based on feedback by respondents to our questionnaires, we conclude that 
investment firms generally do not ask investors for prior consent to do so.  
We refer to Article 7 lit. e of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EG), prescribing that 
personal data may be processed also without consent if the processing is necessary for 
compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject.96  We point to the 
ongoing review of the existing Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) which may cause 
additional changes in the future. 
                                          
96 Article 38 (2) of the Austrian Banking law (Bankwesengesetz), for instance, provides additionally for an 
exception from the banking secrecy. 
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6. SYSTEMIC RISK IN DIFFERENT SCENARIOS 
KEY FINDINGS 
 For three reasons, systemic risk with investment firms is considerably smaller than 
with (commercial) banks. First, with investment firms there is usually no maturity 
mismatch between short-term liabilities and illiquid/long-term assets. Second, 
investors have a proprietary claim; therefore they are less likely than bank 
depositors to make a ‘run’ on the financial institution. Third, investment firms do not 
operate (or are systemically important members of) a payment system such that an 
investment firm’s failure is not very likely to cause spill over effects. 
 Compared to banks, systemic risk in the insurance industry is generally lower as 
well, mainly for the first and third reason given above. However, insurers can cause 
considerable spill over effects if they engage a lot in non-core activities (e.g., 
derivatives trading or credit default swaps) while being highly leveraged (e.g. AIG).  
 The failure of an ICS is unlikely to cause systemic effects because the level of 
interconnectedness is low.  
 With partial or full ICS replacement, systemic risk might be higher because the level 
of interconnectedness is generally higher with insurance firms. Partial insurance will 
increase systemic risk if ICS and insurer rely on each others risk controlling and risk 
assessment (free rider problem).  
 Unlimited coverage per investment firm will increase systemic risk as well, because 
the failure of a large investment firm may trigger difficulties in the insurance 
undertaking providing cover (which might affect its other insurance business). 
 Insurance supervisors do not expect ICS replacement by private insurance contracts 
to increase systemic risk, as long as adequate liability caps are being used. Private 
insurance contracts covering total damage would considerably increase systemic 
risk. By and large, the same holds true for ‘excess of loss’ insurances purchases by 
ICS. 
 Supervisors acknowledge the risk of coordination problems (‘team problem’) 
between insurance undertakings and ICS but do not expect it to cause a systemic 
risk. 
 Given the nature of markets, 70% of supervisors comment positively on insurance 
pooling solutions. As supervisors doubt the changes of realising such pools within 
their Member States, cross-border cooperation might be necessary. 70% of 
supervisors see no increase in systemic risk caused by insurance pools. 
6.1. Introduction 
6.1.1. Definitions and forms of systemic risks 
In the literature, there is no generally accepted definition of systemic risk yet. We follow 
the definition suggested by the Group of Ten: ‘Systemic risk is the risk that an event will 
trigger a loss of economic value or confidence in a substantial segment of the financial 
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system that is serious enough to have significant adverse effects on the real economy with 
a high probability.’97 
This definition mentions two important characteristics of systemic risk: economic spill over 
effects and significant adverse effects on the real economy.98 Spill over effects imply that 
the failure of one financial institution spreads to other financial institutions. There might be 
different sources of such ‘contagion’:99 
 Asset price contagion: Financial institutions might be forced - e.g. in order to meet 
capital requirements - to sell large amounts of assets at prices which are temporarily 
depressed. These ‘fire sales’ further depress market values of assets of other 
institutions. 
 Counterparty contagion: Shocks to some firms make them unable to meet 
commitments to counterparties which adversely affect the counterparties to default 
on their commitments. This might cascade through the financial market. 
 Contagion due to uncertainty and opacity of information: Uncertainty about potential 
financial problems makes parties to become reluctant to trade which aggravates the 
frictions in the financial market. 
 Irrational contagion: Investors and/or customers withdraw funds regardless of the 
question whether the financial institution is in financial distress or not.  
6.1.2. Indicators of systemic risks 
In order to be able to evaluate whether partial or full insurance will increase systemic risk 
we need to think of indicators capturing systemic risk. Cummins and Weiss distinguish 
between primary indicators and contributing factors.100 
Primary indicators directly relate to potential spill over effects, like interconnectedness, 
size of a financial institution and lack of substitutability.101 Interconnectedness refers to the 
degree of correlation among financial institutions, i.e. to which extent financial distress of 
one institution will probably increase financial distress with another institution because of 
the network of financial claims. The network is based on the asset and liabilities side of the 
balance sheet (e.g. by interbank lending), but also, e.g., by derivative transactions, off-
balance sheet commitments.  
Size is a proxy for interconnectedness. With increasing size of the financial institution the 
connections to other institutions are more significant. Contagious effects are usually 
stronger with bigger financial institutions, i.e. that some of them might be ‘too big to fail’. 
Lack of substitutability is defined as the extent to which the service of a failed institution 
can be provided by others. For instance, it might be difficult to quickly replace payment and 
settlement systems. The level of market concentration and the ease of market entry are 
quantitative indicators for the lack of substitutability which by itself again reflects a 
dimension of interconnectedness. 
Contributing factors increase the likelihood or the size of spill over effects. Cummins and 
Weiss102 mention (1) leverage, (2) liquidity risks and maturity mismatches, (3) complexity 
                                          
97 Group of Ten (2001) at p. 126. 
98 Cummins and Weiss (2010) at p. 9. 
99 Harrington (2009) at p. 802. 
100 Cummins and Weiss (2010). 
101 Cummins and Weiss (2010), at p. 10-14. 
102 Cummins and Weiss (2010), at p. 14-17. 
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and (4) government policy and regulation (for similar factors, see Billio).103 These factors 
tend to increase the likelihood of financial distress and thus, the vulnerability of 
systemically important financial institutions. 
Liquidity risk might occur, if liabilities are rather short-term and assets are long-term (as 
with banks) or if most assets are illiquid, that is, difficult to sell.  
Financial institutions offering a wide variety of services such as banking, insurance and 
investment products are organisationally complex. Geographic complexity refers to 
multinational institutions, product complexity to new and complex financial products which 
might not be well understood. Each form of complexity is prone to increase the level of 
interconnectedness and/or impair the ability of supervising bodies to effectively monitor the 
financial institution.  
Government policy and regulation may increase moral hazard of financial institutions, for 
instance, by establishing deposit guarantee schemes and insurance guarantee fund 
protection. Of course such devices decrease the probability of runs but they also impair the 
ex ante incentives to avoid financial distress, as for instance, by excessive risk taking.104 
6.2. Systemic risks with investment firms, with banks and with 
insurance undertakings 
Investment firms differ from banks in two important aspects.105 In contrast to banks 
there is no maturity mismatch between short-term liabilities and illiquid or long-term 
assets. Investment firms should be able to liquidate most of their assets quickly and at fair 
market value. Unlike banks, investment firms are also required to segregate the funds of 
their clients. As a consequence, the client does not have a personal claim (as the depositor 
has against the bank) but a proprietary claim which is attached to a specific property. 
Investors are less likely to run on their investment firm because they do not need to be 
afraid that the investment firm liquidates their assets. Investment firms are also less likely 
to run into liquidity problems. Still, if investment firms are sufficiently large and engage in 
innovative and complex financial transactions (on their own account), spill over effects 
cannot be excluded. We were unable to find evidence that explicitly addresses systemic 
effects of investment firms. Overall, systemic risk is much less an issue with investment 
firms than with banks. Of course, banks engaging in both, investment services and 
commercial banking are more likely to potentially cause systemic risk than pure investment 
firms are. 
As opposed to banks, insurance firms do not take (short-term) deposits and are not 
important members of payment systems as their core business.106  Liabilities are rather 
long-term. Insurance premiums have to be paid on a regular basis to ensure that there is a 
constant operative cash flow. Unlike banks, they have no maturity mismatch which is 
inherent to the business model of the insurance industry.107 However, insurers can cause 
spill over effects if they engage a lot in non-core activities such as credit default swaps 
(CDS), insuring financial products or derivatives trading.108 In fact, the crisis of the big US 
insurer AIG is said to be strongly influenced by AIG providing financial products such as 
                                          
103 Billio et al. (2012). 
104 IADI (2009) at p. 7. 
105 Alexander, 2011, p. 30. 
106 Bell and Keller (2009). 
107 Since generally there is no maturity mismatch between insurance firms’ liabilities and assets, procyclical and 
systemic effects of capital regulation (Solvency II) are less likely to occur with insurance firms than with 
banks. 
108 Billio et al. (2012) at p. 536. 
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CDS.109 In this case, high leverage and short-term funding (e.g., by commercial papers) 
make systemically relevant insurers more vulnerable. But the empirical evidence suggests 
that systemic risk in the insurance industry is much more limited than in the banking 
industry. 110  However, insurers with substantial non-core activities such as derivatives 
trading and with high leverage and/or high liquidity risk are more likely to cause spill over 
effects. 111  In the past decade, the different financial sectors have become increasingly 
interrelated; thus it has become more likely that even non-banks may cause systemic 
risks.112  
6.3. Systemic risks with no insurance, partial ICS replacement and 
full ICS replacement 
Without insurance, systemic risks could only occur with the ICS. As argued above, both 
the proprietary claim of investors and the lower level of interconnectedness of investment 
firms make it quite unlikely that the failure of even a bigger investment firm will adversely 
affect other financial institutions or the real economy. The failure of Phoenix in Germany in 
2005 with total damages of about EUR 260 million did not cause any systemic effects even 
though it was by far the biggest investment firm in the relevant ICS. If an ICS fails, 
investors might lose confidence in investment firms. However, it is unlikely that banks 
offering investment services will severely suffer from that as well. 
With partial ICS replacement, the failure of a big investment firm may have adverse 
effects on both, the ICS and the insurer. Whether insurers are a cause for systemic effects 
depends on many factors such as the extent of the insurer’s non-core activities (especially 
derivatives trading), leverage and liquidity risks. Even though there is lack of evidence, the 
level of interconnectedness might be higher with insurers than with ICS. Consequently, 
systemic risks might be higher with partial insurance than without insurance. 
There is another problem which supports this claim and which relates to the ‘free rider 
problem’ mentioned above. Insurer and ICS may have impaired incentives to properly 
evaluate and control risk because they rely on each other. This may increase the probability 
of investment firms failing. The problem is that the ‘free rider problem’ systematically 
affects all investment firms in a way that correlation of risks increases. As a consequence, 
systemic risk within the investment firms increases as well. Whether this spreads to other 
financial sectors or even to the real economy is a question which warrants further empirical 
investigation. 
With full ICS replacement, the insurer suffers more from a failure of a big investment 
firm. In case of unlimited liability, the insurer may become financially distressed and – 
depending on the level of interconnectedness – may adversely affect other financial 
institutions or sectors. However, with limited liability, the ICS might have to cover damages 
beyond insurers' limited coverage. In this case, the free rider problem remains. 
Any form of insurance naturally introduces moral hazard.113 Investment firms might be 
more willing to undertake risky investments or to under-invest in effective risk 
management.114 Even ICS may be less motivated to properly monitor the investment firms. 
Moral hazard increases the risk of failure systematically and hence, is a source of systemic 
risk. In order to mitigate moral hazard, insurers, investment firms and ICS need to have 
                                          
109 Harrington (2009). 
110 Cummins and Weiss (2010), Muns and Bijlsma (2011), Billio et al. (2012). 
111 Cummins and Weiss (2010). 
112 Billio et al. (2012). 
113 IADI (2009), p. 7. 
114 Bigus and Prigge (2005). 
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proper incentives to decrease the probability and the size of damages, e.g. investment 
firms should pay risk-sensitive charges to insurers (and/or preferably to the ICS as well). 
Further, it is worth to mention a possible trade-off between better risk diversification and 
higher systemic risk. If an insurer takes over investment firms' risk from several ICS, risk 
diversification will certainly improve. However, if the insurer faces financial distress, 
systemic effects are more likely to occur than with the smaller ICS. 
So far, we focused on investment firms. With banks engaging in investment services (and 
deposit and loan business), the picture is different. Banks are more likely than insurers to 
transmit shocks to other financial institutions and even to the real economy. It seems to be 
doubtful that partial or full insurance according to the Basic Model will significantly decrease 
systemic risks of banks; rather, the insurance sector might be negatively affected as well. 
6.4. Supervisors’ assessment 
In order to be able to measure systemic risk in a more applied matter, all national 
insurance supervisors as well as EIOPA were asked to give an assessment of the systemic 
consequences of private insurance taking by investment firms and/or ICS. We also asked 
supervisors on pooling solutions and state-run insurance undertakings. 
6.4.1. Insurance and systemic risk 
A constant and large majority of insurance supervisors is of the opinion that introducing 
private insurance as a (partial) substitute to ICS per se does not change systemic risk. This 
assessment is valid for full mandatory private insurance, for full voluntary private insurance 
and for voluntary partial private insurance. A constant and small minority of supervisors 
sees a small increase in systemic risk as a consequence of the inability of insurance 
undertakings to calculate premiums appropriately or if a race to the bottom in premiums 
occurs as a consequence of competition in a market with few customers. One supervisor 
sees a strong increase in systemic risk, without giving reasons for its assessment. 
This rather positive assessment seems however to be very dependent on the amount of 
compensation that insurance undertakings are willing to take on. The feedback above is 
based on a scenario where insurance undertakings compensate at most EUR 20 million per 
investment firm per year. Moving closer to the EP’s ideas and considering unlimited cover 
(i.e. no liability cap) supervisors’ assessment on systemic risk changes. About one half of 
the supervisors see considerable systemic risk when offering unlimited cover. Within that 
group, almost all supervisors even expect a strong risk increase. The other half of 
supervisors see no systemic risk increase when considering insurance contracts without 
liability cap. Some of those supervisors however make this assessment dependent on the 
existence of adequate re-insurance. 
6.4.2. Team (coordination) problem 
We have questioned insurance supervisors as to whether they expect ‘team problems’ 
under mandatory as well as voluntary full private insurance and under voluntary partial 
private insurance. A ‘team problem’ occurs when insurance undertakings and/or ICS do not 
sufficiently monitor risk at an investment firm, but rely on each other’s risk monitoring 
instead. 
By and large, although quite some supervisors acknowledge that team problems may 
occur, a large majority of supervisors sees no increase in systemic risk because of team 
problems. This majority grows even further when considering voluntary and partial 
insurance.  
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6.4.3. Insurance taken out by ICS 
The large majority of supervisors does not see a systemic risk when ICS purchase private 
insurance. This assessment holds especially true when insurance cover is limited (in our 
example: ‘liability cap’ of EUR 50 million per ICS per year in combination with a cap of EUR 
20 million per investment firm). 
Considering insurance with a liability cap exclusively on the level of the investment firm 
(and not on the level of the ICS), the large majority of supervisors still sees no significant 
increase in systemic risk. However, a number of supervisors argue that such potentially 
high sums are not insurable on their national markets, but that pooled (cross-border) 
insurance may be a solution. 
Asking specifically about systemic risk connected with an ‘excess of loss’ insurance as 
purchased by the Irish ICS, a majority of supervisors sees no effects on systemic risk; one 
even sees a significant decrease in systemic risk. Within the minority of supervisors seeing 
risk increases, some argue that national insurance markets are too small to offer such 
insurance. 
6.4.4. Suboptimal risk diversification and pooling solutions 
Given that some Member States show a small number of investment firms and potentially a 
large number of insurance undertakings, we see a theoretical risk that insurance will lead 
to suboptimal risk diversification (in fact, risk concentration). The majority of supervisors 
(65%) do not expect this risk to materialise. They refer to re-insurance which may mitigate 
these problems. One supervisor stresses that not the number of investment firms is 
relevant but the investment volumes. The vast majority of supervisors (85%) believe that 
the Solvency-II rules are able to cope with this risk concentration problem in an 
appropriate way.  
75% of supervisors believe that insurance pools are an adequate way to bypass suboptimal 
risk diversification problems. However, at the same time 30% of all supervisors have 
serious doubts that such pools are feasible in their national markets, as some of these 
markets might be too small to form such pools. About 70% of supervisors see no systemic 
danger in pursuing such insurance pools. However, as a majority of 70% of respondents 
believe that insurance undertakings established in their Member State will engage in cross-
border insurance activities with investment firms or ICS located in other Member States, 
the issue of limited pools in national markets might be solvable by designing cross-border 
insurance pools. 
6.4.5. State-run insurance undertakings 
Considering a scenario of mandatory insurance, a small majority of insurance supervisors 
do not expect problems concerning a lack of experience of state-run insurance offering 
such mandatory insurance. They estimate the risk for a state-run insurer to get the 
assessment of an investment firm’s risk wrong to be similar to a private insurance 
undertaking assessing this risk. Two supervisors stress the risk of possible political 
influence, both on the level of premiums and on the offering of insurances to investment 
firms which would not be able to resort to insurance with private insurance undertakings.  
Given the specialist nature of a state-insurance undertaking offering mandatory insurance, 
45% of supervisors expect a problematic degree of risk diversification of such an insurance 
undertaking. However, only 35% of supervisors expect a worsening of systemic risk by 
introducing state-run insurance. A number of supervisors mention the likelihood of 
subsidies being paid to state-run insurance. One supervisor points to the fact that 
artificially low insurance premiums (given possible subsidies) might impair incentives on 
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the side of the investment firms which might not spend as much effort as they should do to 
avoid fraud, etc. Without giving a detailed explanation, 45% of supervisors point out a 
similar concern. 
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7. TRANSPARENCY ISSUES 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Investment firms should not be required to inform (potential) clients about the 
terms of the insurance contracts (premium, deductible, etc.) or about the ICS 
contributions because insurance contracts and investment firms (risk exposure) 
differ so much that they are comparable only to a limited extent. This will rather 
cause confusion, especially with partial insurance. Moreover, (small) investors are 
assumed to lack the expertise or the interest to correctly use those pieces of 
information. 
 It does not seem feasible to break down such charges (ICS and/or insurance) to be 
expressed in a fraction of the investment firms overall cost (due to e.g. changing 
number of potential/existing clients, changing risk profile and changing amount of 
assets, ex post additional payments etc.). 
 The ICS and supervisory agencies should have access to the terms of the insurance 
contracts and/or ICS charges since changes in the terms may indicate considerable 
changes in the investment firm’s risk at an early stage.  
7.1. Transparency of insurance premiums and/or ICS 
contributions towards investors? 
Should investment firms inform investors on the insurance premium (and on deductibles) 
and their changes? This piece of information would be valuable only if the risks insured are 
very similar across investment firms. Obviously, with partial insurance this is unlikely to 
happen, since the risks insured, risk exposure and contract details (such as deductibles) 
will or might differ among investment firms. Even with mandatory full insurance, premiums 
are not comparable because larger investment firms are more likely to pay a higher 
insurance premium even though risks might be comparable.  
But even if risks were comparable, (small) investors are often said to lack the expertise 
and/or the interest to correctly assess the soundness of investment firms.115 To sum up, 
insurance premiums and changes of it are comparable across firms only to a limited extent; 
therefore investors are unlikely to deduce the investment firm’s risk out of such 
information.  
If insurance premiums were to indicate with sufficient precision the investment firm’s risk, 
disclosure would probably have a benefit since investment firms have an incentive to limit 
risks in the first place, otherwise investors would switch to a competitor. It is obvious that 
this scenario would not be realisable with voluntary and/or partial insurance because 
insurance contracts are unlikely to be comparable. 
The same arguments hold for the disclosure of ICS contributions. These will not only differ 
with the investment firm’s risk but also with its size making ICS charges comparable only 
to a limited extent. 
                                          
115 Lamandini (2011) at p. 10. Also, during the financial crisis, it turned out that even professional investors were 
unable to correctly foresee and assess the risks related to financial institutions. 
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There might be a risk of disclosure. For instance, in the case of commercial banks, it is 
often argued that information on the bank’s financial distress may erode confidence and 
might even exacerbate distress.116 Thus, a bank run can be triggered and entail systemic 
effects. This argument does not really apply to (pure) investment firms since investors 
have a proprietary claim and a run is less likely to occur. Additionally, systemic risks are 
less pronounced if even existent. 
Both the benefits and the costs117  of disclosing (changes in) insurance premiums (and 
deductibles) and ICS contributions might be very limited. The expected net benefit does not 
justify a mandatory duty of disclosing details on the insurance contract. Therefore, firms 
should not be obliged to inform their clients about these costs, but be able to do so on a 
voluntary basis. 
Disclosure not of the overall payment to the ICS and/or the insurance undertaking(s) but of 
the cost expressed in a fraction to each (potential) transaction of (potential) clients seems 
even more difficult. While the costs might be easily determined, the number of transactions 
and their amount cannot be determined in advance in a way which makes sense. 
Furthermore, even cost may change afterwards, e.g. when the ICS has to ask for ex post 
contributions due to a large payout. Costs may also change because they are supposed to 
vary with the risk profile and the size of the investment firm of which both may change 
over time. 
7.2. Transparency towards ICS and supervisory agencies 
Even though not addressed by the EP proposal, the ICS and supervisory agencies may well 
use information on a change in insurance premiums and deductibles because it possibly 
indicates at an early stage a change in the investment firm’s riskiness.118 Changes in ICS 
contributions might have a similar information value if they are strongly related to the 
firm’s risk. ICS and supervisory agencies are likely to use this information sensibly and 
confidentially in order not to shake confidence in the investment firm immediately. ICS and 
supervisory agencies probably still have time to smoothly fix a potential problem – to the 
benefit of the whole industry. Since there are almost no costs attached to get this piece of 
information, but the benefits are relevant, ICS and supervisory agencies should get 
informed on the details of the insurance contracts but also on changes (such as change in 
premiums and deductibles). 
It is obvious that information on (changes in) insurance premiums is more informative the 
more homogeneous (and the better comparable) are the investment firm’s insurance 
contracts. This is possible rather with mandatory full insurance than with voluntary partial 
insurance. 
If the ICS takes out insurance for its investment firms, the details of the insurance contract 
relate to the pool of investment firms. Supervisory agencies cannot draw any conclusions 
regarding single investment firms’ risk. Thus, disclosure would not be helpful. 
                                          
116 IADI, 2009, p. 23. 
117 Cost is defined in this scenario as retrieving the information on insurance premiums and/or ICS contributions, 
making this information available to (potential and existing) clients, and possible disclosure risk, see 
description above. 
118 See Bigus and Leyens (2008) at p. 125f. As an example, the German Regulation on Contributions to be paid to 
the EdW (§ 2d (3) EdWBeitrV) prescribes that insurance undertakings will notify changes of the crime 
insurance cover premia of single investment firms to the German ICS. However, the investment firm must 
agree with this procedure. 
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7.3. Effects on competition 
Disclosure towards investors will improve competition only if two conditions are met. First, 
details of the insurance contract must be comparable such that investors can learn 
something meaningful from the information disclosed. As argued above, this is possible 
rather with mandatory (full) insurance than with voluntary (full or partial) insurance. Even 
with mandatory insurance, contract details will not fully be comparable since premiums and 
deductibles will not only depend on the investment firm’s risk exposure. Second, even if 
contract terms are comparable to some extent, investors need to have sufficient skills and 
time to interpret the disclosed information correctly. Especially with retail investors, this 
assumption is often challenged. 
Only with voluntary insurance there might be a positive effect on competition because the 
less risky investment firms are more likely to get (affordable) insurance. Investors will 
rather want to do business with investment firms that voluntarily bought insurance. It will 
be less expensive for less risky investment firms to buy insurance.  
If the ICS takes out insurance, the effects of disclosure on competition between investment 
firms are likely to be negligible. Since the terms of the contract relate to the risk of the ICS 
pool of investment firms, investors will be unable to draw conclusions on the individual 
investment firm. However, if there are competing ICS in the market, a voluntary insurance 
may increase investor’s confidence in the ICS. 
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8. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Building on the results of the previous chapters, we would suggest the following 
recommendations. 
8.1. Basic Model 
The introduction of the four ‘events’ (fraud, operational error, administrative malpractice 
and bad advice) in the Basic Model adds an additional layer of complexity to the question 
whether ICS (or insurance undertakings) should compensate (or offer coverage) in a 
specific case.  
We recommend more clarity in the Basic Model. 
First, the events leading to compensation should be described in more detail. It would 
make insurance more likely, if the events’ definition would be adjusted to better fit already 
existing insurance products like crime cover or pecuniary loss insurance. 
Second, burden of proof should be clearly allocated. It should be clear whether the 
investor must prove the existence of e.g. fraud, or if the burden of proof is reversed and 
the investment firm has to prove the opposite. Without these clarifications, we expect 
insurance undertakings to have substantial uncertainties in adequately assessing risk, 
leading to a general reluctance on the side of insurance undertakings to offer (partial or 
full) insurance to investment firms.  
We also recommend to ensure that the wording of the Basic Model reflects legislators’ 
intentions. The current wording (Article 2, paragraph 2a subparagraph 1 as amended by 
the EP) may lead to diminished ICS protection for investors in the future. In our opinion, 
without changes to the wording of the Basic Model, classical cases of ‘bad advice’ will not 
be covered by ICS. In that case, we recommend excluding bad advice from the Basic 
Model. 
8.2. Partial insurance taken out by investment firms 
We do not recommend a partial insurance of single events of the Basic Model (i.e. fraud, 
operational error, administrative malpractice or bad advice). In our opinion, partial 
replacement of ICS does not seem to be a viable option. It might impair incentives of 
insurers, ICS and investment firms. We expect major legal problems concerning the 
allocation of responsibility between ICS and insurance undertakings. This will delay 
compensation and increase litigation costs. 
8.3. Full insurance taken out by investment firms 
Although full and mandatory insurance does come with some potential advantages, we are 
cautious to give a general recommendation for introducing such insurance. It might make 
sense in EU Member States where ICS suffer from poor risk diversification. 
In our opinion, on one hand full and mandatory replacement of the ICS may improve risk 
assessment and risk controlling and the incentives of investment firms. On the other hand, 
it is likely to increase the costs of investor compensation, especially because insurance 
undertakings need data for actuarial risk assessments. Legal and practical difficulties arise, 
but seem manageable. 
Given the responses to our questionnaires, insurance undertakings are currently unlikely to 
offer full insurance even if coverage per investment firm would be limited. The main 
reasons mentioned are insufficient available data for proper risk assessment, the lack of re-
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insurance and the small size of the national markets. Consequently, the insurance 
premiums mentioned in the questionnaires are much higher than current ICS contributions. 
This, however, does not indicate that ICS contributions adequately price the risks of 
investment firms. 
We doubt that insurance undertakings would be willing to offer full insurance with unlimited 
coverage in the medium term, as there seems to be a lack of re-insurance. Consequently, 
an ICS might still be necessary to cover for the failure of large investment firms (assuming 
the ICS is able to do so itself).We do not expect that total costs of investor compensation 
will then decrease. 
8.4. ‘Excess of loss’ insurance taken out by ICS 
From our point of view, the only viable insurance option might be that ICS themselves take 
out ‘excess of loss’ insurance for their investment firms defining an individual liability floor 
and liability cap. Such a solution might improve risk sharing without severely distorting the 
incentives of ICS and insurance undertaking. However, it is unlikely that an insurance 
solution of this kind could cover in full the failure of large investment firms. 
Unfortunately, even though there are examples of such an insurance (Canada, Ireland), 
most ICS did not decide to buy insurance even though they already have the option to do 
so in many EU Member States. This might be due to the scarcity of data on damage 
compensation and a lack of supply of such insurances, given that insurance pools might be 
necessary to offer such insurance. 
We recommend to allow (but not to oblige) ICS in all EU Member States to purchase 
‘excess of loss’ insurance. Given a longer time series on damage compensation cases, in a 
few years time there should be a new assessment regarding the introduction of mandatory 
‘excess of loss’ insurance. 
8.5. Systemic risk and transparency 
Neither full nor partial insurance nor ‘excess of loss’ insurance are considered to cause 
systemic risks as long as there is no unlimited coverage per investment firm without 
adequate re-insurance. Hence, when there is political consensus that insurance contracts 
are to play a role in an ICS context, we recommend contemplating carefully a liability cap 
on the investment firm level, taking into account that this might lower investor protection. 
Transparency on insurance or ICS charges towards investors does not seem to be useful. 
For instance, insurance charges depend on the investment firm’s riskiness, but also on 
other factors such as its size and the risks covered. Consequently, insurance and ICS 
charges are comparable only to a limited extent and thus, investment firms should not be 
required to disclose them. 
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ANNEX 1: GRAPHIC OVERVIEW OF PRIVATE INSURANCE 
WITHIN ICS 
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Figure 4: Partial voluntary replacement of investor compensation schemes by 
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ANNEX 2: QUESTIONNAIRES 
This annex displays the general introduction to the questionnaires as well as the annex. 
The different questions for each group of entities follow. 
a) Questionnaire to insurance associations and insurance undertakings 
b) Questionnaire to insurance supervisors 
c) Questionnaire to ICS 
d) Questionnaire to investment firm associations and investment firms 
 
General Introduction to Questionnaires 
A.   AIM AND DESIGN OF THIS QUESTIONNAIRE 
The  aim  of  this  questionnaire  is  to  gather  input  in  order  to  answer  the  following  question  which  was 
discussed in the European Parliament: 
Can coverage of clients of  investment  firms by  Investor Compensation Schemes  be  replaced  by  coverage 








In  the  European  Union,  Investor  Compensation  Schemes  (ICSs)  cover  for  an  investment  firm’s  inability  to 













‐  bad  advice  regarding  conduct  of  business  obligations  when  providing  investment services to 
clients. 
 Investor  Compensation  Schemes  do  not  cover  customers  of  UCITS  (i.e.  Undertakings  for  Collective 
Investment in Transferable Securities; no change with current legal situation). 
Note:  This  resolution  of  the  European  Parliament  does  not  mean  that  European  law  was  changed  since  no 
agreement between the European Parliament and  the Council of the European Union has been reached yet. 
                                          
119  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2011-
0313&language=EN&ring=A7-2011-0167. 
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 The  investment firm has the  licence to temporarily hold  investors’ securities and to trade them on their 
own account, but is not a bank. 







4. bad  advice  regarding  conduct  of  business  obligations  when  providing  investment services to 
clients.120 
 Investment  firms  are  obliged  by  law  to  conclude  this  reference  insurance  contract with  an  insurance 
company. The insurances replace the Investor Compensation Schemes, which do not longer exist. 
 In  order  to  get  damage  compensation,  an  investor  only  has  to  prove  that  his/her  claim  against  the 
investment firm exists. 
 The reference insurance does not cover UCITS‐clients of investment firms. 
                                          
120  Please note: Damages caused by bad advice are not per se covered by the reference insurance. Coverage only 
applies when the investment firm fails to repay money or return assets as a consequence of bad advice. 
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Appendix: Number of (investment) firms, number of firm failures, highest total 
and average payout for a failure in EU countries. 
















Austria (AeW)  72  1  Current estimate: 11  11  72 
Belgium  138  1  2.6  2.6  138 
Bulgaria  n.a.  0 (2004‐2009)  0 (2004‐2009)  0 (2004‐2009)  n.a. 
Cyprus  28  0  0  0  28 
Czech Rep.  70  15  56  n.a.  70 
Denmark  220  1  1.6  1.6  220 
Estonia  18  0  0  0  18 
Finland  376  0  0  0  376 








Greece  130  9  2.2  n.a.  130 
Hungary  58  13 (1999‐2003)  n.a.  1.3 (1999‐2003)  58 
Ireland  3,590  3  Expected to be less than 8.5 about 3.2  3,590 
Italy  961  15  5.7  0.8  961 
Latvia  26  0  ‐  ‐  26 
Lithuania  32  1  0.06  0.06  32 
Luxemburg  218  0  0  0  218 
Malta  44  0  0  0  44 
Netherlands‐
ICS 
216  6  until 2009: 0.1  0.09  216 
Poland  39  1  7.6  7.6  39 
Portugal  76  0  0  0  76 
Romania  n.a.  0 (2004‐2009)  0 (2004‐2009)  0 (2004‐2009)  n.a. 
Slovakia  40  0  0  0  40 
Slovenia  29  0  0  0  29 
Spain‐
FOGAIN 
127  5  31.8  4.2  127 















Notes:   n.a.: not available. The  schemes  in Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary,  Italy,  Lithuania,  Luxemburg, 
Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden, United Kingdom include both investment firms and banks. The other schemes address 




                                          
121  Source: Oxera 2005, pp. 41 and 111, own calculations. 
PE 492.451 77 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
A. Questionnaire to Insurance Associations and Insurance Undertakings 
1. Please provide for different  liability  scenarios: 















Liability  cap:  EUR  5 
million  per 
investment firm/case 
Liability  cap:  EUR  20 
million per investment 
firm/case 
Liability  cap:  EUR  ... 
mio.  per  investment 
firm/case123 






















Assume  now  that  the  liability  cap  for  the  full  and  mandatory  reference  insurance  contract  is  EUR  20 






(In  order  to  help  you  with  the  pricing,  the  appendix  shows  a  table  with  some  country‐specific 
information: number of  investment  firms, number of  failures, highest  total payout for a failure.) 
                                          
122  Assumptions: Excluding financial advisors in UK and Ireland, 9760 investment firms are member of a national 
investment compensation scheme and manage EUR 2,400 billion in total. (Source: EFAMA and Oxera (2005), 
own calculations.) 
123  If necessary, respondents may define a different liability cap and provide an estimate for the probability and 
insurance premium. 
124  Please note: Damages caused by bad advice are not per se covered by the reference insurance. Coverage only 
applies when the investment firm as a consequence of bad advice fails to repay money or return assets. 
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Change  in  insurance  premium 




... %  Premium  per  investment  firm 
decreases by more  than 50% 
2.  Full  and  mandatory  insurance  but  the  investment  firm 
does not trade securities on its own account 
... %  Premium  per  investment  firm 
decreases by more  than 50% 
3.  Full  and  mandatory  insurance  but  the  investment  firm 
neither trades securities on its own account nor does it have 
a licence to hold investors securities 




... %  Premium  per  investment  firm 
decreases by more  than 50% 
5.  No  full  insurance  only  fraud  risk  is  covered  on  a 
mandatory basis (ICS covers other risks) 
... %  Premium  per  investment  firm 
decreases by more  than 50% 
6.  No  full  insurance  only  negligence  with  malpractice, 
operational error and bad advice is covered on a mandatory 
basis (ICS covers other risks) 
... %  Premium  per  investment  firm 
decreases by more  than 50% 
7.  Full  and mandatory  insurance,  investment  firm manages 
assets of EUR 1 billion. 
... %  Premium  per  investment  firm 
decreases by more  than 50% 
8.  Full  and  mandatory  insurance,  investment  firm  has  an 
equity  ratio  of  10%.8.  Full  and  mandatory  insurance, 
investment firm has an equity ratio of 10%. 
... %  Premium  per  investment  firm 
decreases by more  than 50% 
9.  Full  and  mandatory  insurance  but  one  (1)  insurance 
company offers  the  insurance  contract  to  the  national  ICS 
for all  its members. Assume 200  ICS‐ members  (investment 
firms).  Liability  cap  remains  at  EUR  20  million  per  ICS‐ 
Member per case and EUR 50 million per ICS per year 
... %  Premium  per  investment  firm 
decreases by more  than 50% 
10.  Full  and  mandatory  insurance  but  one  (1)  insurance 




... %  Premium  per  investment  firm 
decreases by more  than 50% 
11. One  (1)  insurance company offers a  full and mandatory 
insurance  contract  to  the  national  ICS  for  all  its  200 
members,  but  only  for  ICS‐  damages  in  excess  of  EUR  10 
million per year, liability cap: EUR 50 million per year 
... %  Premium  per  investment  firm 
decreases by more  than 50% 
12. How likely is it for you as an insurance company to offer 















Fraud and administrative malpractice       
Fraud and operational error       
Fraud and bad advice       
Operational  error  and  administrative 
malpractice 
     
Operational error and bad advice       
Administrative malpractice and bad advice       
                                          
125  Investment Services might be offered by (1) investment firms or by (2) commercial banks. 
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6.  Please  now  provide  additional  information.  Have  you  heard  of  cases where  investment  firms  or  banks 
engaging in investment services in your Member State have already voluntarily bought insurances similar to 
those in the reference insurance? 












No,  I  am  not 
aware  of  any 
bank 
Fraud (alone)         
Administrative 
malpractice (alone) 
       
Operational errors (alone)         
Bad advice (alone)         
'Four in one' package         
 
F.   LEGAL QUESTIONS 





















a)  Please  provide  us  with  any  ideas  you  might  have  on  how  to  reach  insurance  cover  from  the  basic 
model, e.g. in a different setting. 
........................................ 
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Please  tell us how you expect  the different  causes  to  change  the  systemic  risk  compared  to  the 
current  scenario where  investors'  losses  are  covered  by  ICS  but  not  by  insurance  undertakings. 
There  is  a  possibility  to  provide  remarks  and  to  add  other  causes  of  systemic  risk  you  may  find 
relevant. Assume  that  an  insurance undertaking  covers  investors'  losses up  to  EUR 20 million per 
investment firm per case.  
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its members. The  liability  cap  is  EUR 20 million per  ICS‐Member per 
case and additionally EUR 50 million per ICS per year 
   
10. The  ICS takes out an  'excess of  loss'  insurance with one  insurance 






















                                          
126  Given partial replacement of ICS by private insurances, the following 'team' problem may occur: ICS and 
insurance undertaking rely on each other's risk monitoring of the investment firm and cease to appropriately 
monitor relevant risk behaviour of the investment firm. Even under a full replacement of ICS by private 
insurances, such 'team' problem may arise if the ICS were still to cover damage above a certain liability cap 
set by the insurance undertaking. With the current scenario (ICS) there is no team problem. 
127  There might be suboptimal risk diversification given the relatively small number of investment firms an 
insurance might cover (see Annex). 
128  Currently, the ICS covers all losses. 
129  As a reference scenario, we assume that ICS did not take out such excess-loss insurances yet. 
130  Interconnectedness between ICS is very small. 
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how would  the below‐ mentioned  problems  change  compared  to  a  scenario where  there  are only 
private insurance undertakings? Please feel free to provide remarks and add other economic problems 
not mentioned in the table below. 
Potential Problem  State‐run insurance undertaking  vs. private  insurance undertaking 
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your  point  of  view,  which  legal  problems  would  arise  if  insurance  undertakings  were  legally 
obliged  to  offer  an  insurance  contract  according  to  the  'reference  insurance  contract'  to  be 
negotiated with the investment firm? If possible, please refer to elements of national law. 
........................... 







When  investment  firms  (partially)  exit  the  investor  compensation  scheme  and  conclude  private 
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C. Questionnaire to ICS 
C.  USE OF INSURANCE POLICIES BY INVESTOR COMPENSATION SCHEMES AND THEIR MEMBERS 


















 c)  No, but  they  could  in  the past,  from  (year) until  (year). 
We ceased this practice, because: ... 
3.  If YES in 2): Which kind of insurance is accepted by the investor compensation scheme? 
  Crime  insurance,132  which  is  concluded  by  ...  %  of  our  members  and  which  on  average  leads  to  a 
reduction of ... % in the individual member’s contribution to the scheme. 
 Pecuniary  loss  liability  insurance,133 which  is concluded by  ... .% of our members and which on average 
leads to a reduction of ... % in the individual member’s contribution to the scheme. 
  ......  insurance,  which  is  concluded  by  ... %  of  our  members  and  which  on  average  leads  to  a 
reduction of ... % in the individual member’s contribution to the scheme. 
 The following other means ....... can lead to a reduction of contributions by .% 
4.  The  individual  yearly contribution by our members to the  investor compensation scheme  is on average 
EUR . .... 
D.  IMPACT OF BASIC MODEL ON INVESTOR COMPENSATION SCHEME CONTRIBUTIONS 
Please consider  the basic model as defined  in Section B. This model  is  likely not  identical  to  the existing rules 
relevant for compensation from your investor compensation scheme. 
Please  give  your  best  estimate:  which  impact  do  you  expect  the  basic  model  to  have  on  the  current 
contribution  for an average member of your scheme?134 
 No change in the ICS contribution per firm 
                                          
131  Please convert non-euro figures into euro. 
132  Crime insurance (also called business crime cover or fidelity insurance) is a type of insurance concluded by 
businesses that covers for the risk of fraud and other tortuous acts committed by employees of a company 
('confidants') or third persons, for whom the company is liable. Typically, claims have their causation in 
employee's or third persons' dishonesty, robbery, embezzlement, forgery, theft or computer-related crime. 
133  The 'pecuniary loss liability insurance' provides coverage for the infringement of contractual duties undertaken 
by employees of the company with the consequence of real pecuniary detriment. Pecuniary loss liability 
insurances thus protect policyholders from, for instance, operational error, administrative malpractice or bad 
advice. 
134  We are aware of the fact that many investor compensation schemes are not able to change on their own the 
level of the investor compensation scheme contribution. We are asking you here to give your best economic 
assessment of which change in contribution would be necessary/appropriate to cover the investor 
compensation scheme's financial risks as defined by the basic model. 
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E.  IMPACT OF TAKING OUT  INSURANCE  POLICIES ON THE  'BASIC MODEL CONTRIBUTION' TO  INVESTOR 
COMPENSATION SCHEMES 
We now consider one modification of the basic model contract at a time. 
Please  give  an  estimate:  as  a  consequence  of  each  of  these  changes,  how  would  an  average member’s 
basic model contribution  to the investor compensation scheme change? 






















4.  The  ICS  compensates  investors, but damage between  EUR  10 Mio 














Please  consider  the  case where  investment  firms are no longer legally obliged to be fully covered as members of 
the  investor  compensation  scheme  in  view of  their  investor  compensation  risk.  E.g.:  if  investment  firms  can 
present proof of an  insurance policy  for a certain part of the basic model (e.g.: fraud), their contribution in the 
investor compensation scheme would only cover the remaining events. 
a)  Do  you  see  legal  problems  connected  with  possible  consequences  of  the  partial  replacement  of 
investor compensation by private insurance policies taken out by investment firms on a voluntarily basis? 
If yes, which?  
                                          
135  This means: ICS at first compensates all claims up to a total payout of EUR 10 Mio. per year. Those parts of 
yearly compensation claims exceeding EUR 10 Mio. are born by tax payers up to a yearly subsidy of max. EUR 
40 Mio. 
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E.g.:  some  ICS  members  might  conclude  private  fraud  insurance  and  request  a  lower  contribution 
to  the  ICS as a  consequence. The  ICS might  then have  to  increase  the overall contributions  for  those 
members remaining in the investor compensation scheme. 
 
b)  Do  you  see  legal problems  connected with  the partial  replacement of  investor  compensation  scheme 
































c)  In case of such  full replacement of  investor compensation schemes by private  insur‐ ance cover, do you 
expect changes in the contributions to those deposit guarantee schemes? 
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D. Questionnaire to Investment Firm Associations and Investment Firms 
C.   CURRENT AND/OR PAST USE OF INSURANCES BY INVESTMENT FIRMS 




 c)  No, but it was possible in the past from  (year) to  (year) 
  d)   Comments: ... 


















4.  Do  or  did  you  take  out  insurances  for  one  or more  of  the  events  of  the  basic model  (e.g.  fraud), even 





                                          
136  Please convert non-euro figures into euro. 
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Please  consider  the  case  where  investment  firms  are  no  longer  legally  obliged  to  be  fully  covered  as 
members  of  the  investor  compensation  scheme  in  view  of  their  investor  compensation  risk.  E.g.:  if 
investment firms can present proof of an  insurance policy for a certain part of the basic model (e.g.: fraud), 
their contribution in the investor compensation scheme would only cover the remaining events. 
a)  Do  you  see  legal  problems  connected  with  possible  consequences  of  the  partial  re‐  placement  of 
investor  compensation  by private  insurance policies  taken  out  by  in‐  vestment  firms on  a  voluntarily 
basis? If yes, which? 
E.g.: some ICS members might conclude fraud insurance and request a lower contribution to the ICS as a 
consequence.  The  ICS  might  then  have  to  increase  the  overall  contributions  for  those  members 
remaining in the investor compensation scheme. 
 
b) Do  you  see  legal problems  connected with  the partial  replacement of  investor  compensation  scheme 
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